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REPUTATION IN THE LONG-RUN WITH IMPERFECT MONITORING1
Alp E. Atakan and Mehmet Ekmekci
We study an inﬁnitely repeated game where two players with equal discount
factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage-
game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage-
game actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is private information and
he may be a “commitment type,” drawn from a countable set of commitment
types, who is locked into playing a particular strategy. Under a full-support as-
sumption on the monitoring structure, we prove a reputation result for games
with locally nonconﬂicting interests or games with strictly conﬂicting interests:
if there is positive probability that player one is a particular type whose commit-
ment payoﬀ is equal to player one’s highest payoﬀ, consistent with the players’
individual rationality, then a patient player one secures this type’s commitment
payoﬀ in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. In contrast, if the
type’s commitment payoﬀ is strictly less than player one’s highest payoﬀ con-
sistent with the players’ individual rationality, then the worst perfect Bayesian
equilibrium payoﬀ for a patient player one is equal to his minimax payoﬀ.
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31. Introduction
The desire to maintain one’s reputation is a powerful incentive in a long-run relationship as
a strong reputation can lend credibility to an individual’s (or an institution’s) commitments,
threats, or promises. It can help a ﬁrm commit to ﬁght competitors planning to enter its
market, it can assist a government in committing to its monetary and ﬁscal policies, or it
can facilitate trade based on trust when formal institutions are lacking. In fact, a patient
player’s reputation concerns are the dominant incentives that determine equilibrium payoﬀs
in repeated games where a patient player faces a myopic opponent. And this is true regardless
of the monitoring structure.1
Building a reputation when facing an equally patient opponent, however, is more diﬃ-
cult. A patient opponent might be willing to sacriﬁce short-term payoﬀs to test whether
the player, who is trying to build a reputation, will go through with his threats or promises.
This makes it prohibitively expensive to build a reputation in certain repeated simultaneous-
move games played against a patient opponent if stage-game actions are perfectly monitored
(Cripps and Thomas (1997)). In this paper, we instead focus on repeated simultaneous-
move games played by equally patient players where the opponent’s stage-game actions are
imperfectly monitored. A leading example of signiﬁcant economic interest is the repeated
principal-agent game. We show that reputation eﬀects are prominent under imperfect mon-
itoring even in certain repeated games where reputation eﬀects are absent under perfect
monitoring.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that player one’s type is private information and that he may be a
“commitment type” who is locked into playing a particular strategy. We explore whether
an uncommitted or “normal” player can exploit his opponent’s uncertainty to establish a
reputation for a particular behavior. We also address two related questions. First, we ask
which behavior (strategy or strategic posture) would a “normal” player mimic in order to
successfully build a beneﬁcial reputation? In other words, which types, if available, facilitate
reputation building for player one?2 Second, we ask in which strategic situations (i.e., for
which class of stage games) can player one successfully build a reputation?
Our central ﬁnding is a reputation result in repeated games where player one (he) observes
only an imperfect public signal of his opponent’s stage-game action while his opponent (she)
perfectly monitors player one’s actions. We show that a patient player one can guarantee his
highest payoﬀ compatible with the players’ individual rationality (player one’s highest IR
1See Fudenberg and Levine (1989) for the case of perfect monitoring, Fudenberg and Levine (1992) for
imperfect public monitoring, and Gossner (2011) for imperfect private monitoring.
2 We say that a certain type is available if player two believes that player one is this type with positive
probability.
1payoﬀ) in any Bayesian-Nash equilibrium of the repeated game. For our reputation result,
we assume that a certain commitment type, which satisﬁes two properties, is available. The
ﬁrst property, which we call no shortfall, requires that the type’s commitment payoﬀ is
equal to player one’s highest IR payoﬀ.3 The second requires that the per period cost of
not best responding to this type is positive, even for an arbitrarily patient player two. If
this type is available, then player one guarantees this type’s commitment payoﬀ simply by
mimicking its strategy, even if player two believes that player one is another commitment type
with arbitrarily higher probability. In other words, this commitment type with no shortfall
facilitates reputation building.
For our reputation result, we also assume that the stage game has either locally noncon-
ﬂicting interests (LNCI) or strictly conﬂicting interests (SCI).4 There are LNCI in a game
if player two’s payoﬀ, in the payoﬀ proﬁle where player one receives his highest IR payoﬀ,
strictly exceeds her pure minimax payoﬀ. There are SCI in a game if player one has an action
(a Stackelberg action) such that any best response to this action yields player one his highest
IR payoﬀ and yields player two her minimax payoﬀ.5 These restrictions on the stage game
ensure the existence of a commitment type that satisﬁes the aforementioned two properties.
We turn next to the question of whether player one can still beneﬁt from such a reputation
even if some of the assumptions of our main reputation result are violated. For this analysis,
we restrict attention to commitment types that play repeated-game strategies with limited
complexity (i.e., ﬁnite automata).6 In particular, suppose that, in contrast to our no-shortfall
assumption, the shortfall for the only available commitment type is positive (i.e., the type’s
commitment payoﬀ is less than player one’s highest IR payoﬀ). In this case, we show that
a patient player one’s worst equilibrium payoﬀ is equal to his minimax. Therefore, player
one guarantees only his lowest payoﬀ if he compromises by mimicking a commitment type
with positive shortfall. Taken in conjunction with our reputation result, this implies that
reputation building against an equally patient rival is an all-or-nothing phenomenon: player
one guarantees either his best or only his worst repeated-game payoﬀ.
As this discussion suggests, player one can successfully build a beneﬁcial reputation by
mimicking a commitment type, which is a ﬁnite automaton, if and only if the type has no
3The commitment payoﬀ of a type is the payoﬀ that player one can guarantee by publicly committing
to play the repeated-game strategy that this type plays. A type’s (or strategy’s) shortfall is the diﬀerence
between player one’s highest IR payoﬀ and the type’s commitment payoﬀ.
4We also assume that the stage-game satisﬁes a certain technical genericity property. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that the payoﬀ proﬁle in which player one obtains his highest IR payoﬀ is unique. We term this
genericity property no gap.
5The Stackelberg payoﬀ for player one is the highest payoﬀ he can guarantee in the stage-game through
public commitment to a stage-game action (a Stackelberg action). See Mailath and Samuelson (2006,
page 465), for a formal deﬁnition.
6A ﬁnite automaton is an automaton with a ﬁnite number of states.
2shortfall. For our reputation result, we ensure that a commitment type with no shortfall exists
by assuming that the stage game has either LNCI or SCI. Now suppose that, in contrast to
this assumption, the stage-game has neither LNCI nor SCI. In this case, we show that there
is no ﬁnite automaton with no shortfall. Therefore, player one’s worst equilibrium payoﬀ is
equal to his minimax regardless of which ﬁnite automaton he mimics. In other words, it is
not possible for player one to successfully build a beneﬁcial reputation by mimicking a ﬁnite
automaton unless the stage game has either LNCI or SCI.
Finally, we turn to identifying stage games for which there is a ﬁnite automaton with no
shortfall. We show that there is a ﬁnite automaton with no shortfall if and only if there is a
stage-game action (a strong Stackelberg action) whose commitment payoﬀ is equal to player
one’s highest IR payoﬀ. Such games are a strict subset of the games with LNCI or SCI.7
If there is a strong Stackelberg action, then the ﬁnite automaton that plays this action in
every period has no shortfall; moreover, player one can guarantee his highest IR payoﬀ by
mimicking this type. Hence, whenever player one can successfully build a reputation, he can
do so by mimicking the least complex commitment type, i.e., a simple type that plays the
strong Stackelberg action in each period. In other words, added complexity does not improve
a patient player one’s worst equilibrium payoﬀ as long as the complexity is still ﬁnite.
One key assumption, which we have not yet discussed at length, is that player one does not
observe player two’s intended action, but only sees an imperfect signal of it, as in a model of
moral hazard. We also assume that the support of the distribution of signals is independent
of how player two plays; we call this the full-support imperfect-monitoring assumption. This
assumption is indispensable and, intuitively, ensures that every reward and punishment in
player one’s strategy will occasionally be triggered, so that player two will learn how player
one responds to all sequences of public outcomes. We discuss this assumption in more detail
in section 5.1.
We obtain our reputation result by calculating a lower bound, which holds across all
equilibria, on player one’s payoﬀ when he mimics a commitment type that plays a pure
strategy (as in Fudenberg and Levine (1989)). In this context, our assumption that player
one’s stage-game actions are perfectly monitored greatly aids our analysis. This is because
the perfect-monitoring assumption simpliﬁes the dynamics of how player one’s reputation
evolves. In particular, because player two perfectly monitors player one’s stage-game actions
and because the commitment type plays a pure strategy, player one’s reputation level weakly
increases - but only as long as player two observes him play the same stage-game action as
7 If the stage game has LNCI and if there is no stage-game action whose commitment payoﬀ is equal to
player one’s highest IR payoﬀ, then the commitment type with no shortfall is not a ﬁnite automaton. In such
games we construct the required commitment type’s strategy using an inﬁnite number of states.
3the action the commitment type would have played; otherwise, his reputation level collapses
to zero.8 If we relax the assumption that player one’s actions are perfectly monitored, then a
technically challenging statistical learning problem arises. Whether an appropriate statistical
learning technique can be developed or applied for this framework remains an open question
beyond the scope of this paper.9,10
Lastly, the reputation results in games with asymmetric discounting (Fudenberg and Levine
(1989, 1992) or Celentani et al. (1996)) are robust to the introduction of two-sided un-
certainty, while the reputation result that we present in this paper is not. In order to
obtain our one-sided reputation result, we allow for only one-sided uncertainty. In other
words, we replace asymmetric discount factors as in Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) or
Celentani et al. (1996) with one-sided asymmetric information.
1.1. Related literature and our contribution. This paper is most closely related to
work on reputation eﬀects in repeated simultaneous-move games with equally patient agents
(see Cripps and Thomas (1997), Cripps et al. (2005), and Chan (2000)).11 We make three
main contributions to this literature. First, we provide the ﬁrst reputation result for games
with LNCI.12 Previous reputation results are for either stage games with SCI (Cripps et al.
(2005)) or strictly-dominant-action stage games (Chan (2000)).13 Second, we are the ﬁrst to
explore reputation eﬀects under imperfect monitoring. Previous work assumed perfect moni-
toring. Finally, our work highlights the role that full-support imperfect monitoring plays for a
reputation eﬀect in repeated games with LNCI. Without full-support imperfect monitoring,
our reputation result may fail to obtain for repeated games with LNCI (Cripps and Thomas
(1997) and Chan (2000)).
This paper also relates to work on reputation eﬀects in repeated games where a pa-
tient player one faces a nonmyopic, but arbitrarily less patient, opponent (Schmidt (1993),
Celentani et al. (1996), Aoyagi (1996), Cripps et al. (1996), Evans and Thomas (1997)). In
8We use these dynamics in proving both reputation results and our non reputation results.
9Fudenberg and Levine (1992)’s learning result (Theorem 4.1) does not help in our framework with equally
patient agents.
10Note that we place no restriction on player one’s other commitment types. In fact, we allow player
one’s other commitment types to be any countable set of ﬁnite automata including those which play mixed
strategies. For example, if there is a strong Stackelberg action in the stage-game, and the set of player one’s
types is any set of ﬁnite automata that includes the simple type that plays the pure strong Stackelberg action
in each period, then player one guarantees his highest IR payoﬀ.
11By equal patience, we mean that the players share the same discount factor. There is also a literature
on reputation eﬀects in repeated games without discounting. See, for example, Cripps and Thomas (1995).
12Atakan and Ekmekci (2011) also present a reputation result for repeated games with LNCI and equally
patient players. However, in that paper the stage game is an extensive-form game of perfect information as
opposed to the simultaneous-move game that we assume here.
13For a precise deﬁnition of a strictly-dominant-action stage game, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006),
Page 540.
4repeated games where a patient player faces a less patient opponent, Celentani et al. (1996)
and Aoyagi (1996) establish reputation results under full-support imperfect monitoring. How-
ever, as in the case with equal discounting, under perfect monitoring a reputation result is
obtained only in games with conﬂicting interests (see Schmidt (1993) and Cripps et al. (1996)
for a generalization).
Although the results in repeated games with a less patient opponent are similar in spirit to
the results we establish here, we should point out three important diﬀerences. First, against
a less patient opponent, player one can build a reputation by mimicking a commitment type
with positive shortfall, i.e., player one can guarantee a compromise payoﬀ (Celentani et al.
(1996) and Cripps et al. (1996)). In contrast, this is not possible when player one faces an
equally patient opponent. Second, with equally patient agents, the limitation on the types
that facilitate reputation building to those with no shortfall implies a restriction on the class
of stage games (i.e., those with SCI and LNCI). Again, this contrasts with the case where
player one faces a less patient opponent, as in Celentani et al. (1996). Because player one
can guarantee a compromise payoﬀ against a less patient opponent, Celentani et al. (1996)
are able to establish a reputation result which applies to all stage games when there is full-
support imperfect monitoring. Third, the arguments for reputation results in repeated games
where player one faces a less patient opponent rely on the learning result (Theorem 4.1) in
Fudenberg and Levine (1992). In our framework with equally patient players, this learning
result has no traction. We instead introduce a dynamic-programming methodology where
the state variable is player two’s beliefs.14
This paper is also closely related to Atakan and Ekmekci (2011), which proves a repu-
tation result for repeated extensive-form games of perfect information with equally patient
players. The three main diﬀerences between the two papers are as follows: First, in this
paper we study the Bayesian equilibria of repeated simultaneous-move games whereas the
focus of Atakan and Ekmekci (2011) is on the perfect Bayesian equilibria of a repeated game
where the two players never move simultaneously. In particular, the reputation result of
Atakan and Ekmekci (2011) leverages the particular form of sequential rationality, implied
by perfect Bayesian equilibrium for games where the two players move sequentially, in a way
that one cannot if the two players move simultaneously or if the focus is on Bayesian equi-
libria. Two, this paper assumes imperfect monitoring whereas Atakan and Ekmekci (2011)
assumes that both players’ moves are perfectly monitored. Three, here we assume that the
other commitment types (i.e., the commitment types other than the type that player one
14Also, see Cripps and Thomas (2003) for an asymptotic contrast of the equilibrium payoﬀ sets of
incomplete-information repeated games where the players share the same discount factor with those games
where the informed player is arbitrarily more patient than his opponent.
5mimics) are ﬁnite automata but we place no restriction on player two’s prior. In contrast, the
reputation result in Atakan and Ekmekci (2011) depends on the set of other commitment
types having suﬃciently low prior probability.
2. The model
We consider an inﬁnitely repeated game in which a ﬁnite, two-player, simultaneous-move
stage game Γ is played in periods t ∈ {0,1,2,...}. The players discount payoﬀs using a
common discount factor δ ∈ [0,1). For any set X, ∆(X) denotes the set of all probability
distribution functions over X. The set of pure actions for player i in the stage game is Ai,
and the set of mixed stage-game actions is ∆(Ai). After each period, player two’s stage-game
action is imperfectly observed through a public signal while player one’s pure stage-game
action is perfectly observed.15 Let Y denote the set of public signals generated by player two’s
actions. Thus, after each period, a public signal (a1,y) ∈ A1×Y is observed. The probability
of signal y if player two chooses action a2 ∈ A2 is πy(a2). For any mixed action α2 ∈ ∆(A2),
πy(α2) :=
 
a2∈A2 α2(a2)πy(a2). We maintain the following full-support imperfect-monitoring
assumption throughout the paper:
Assumption (FS) Deﬁne π := min(a2,y)∈A2×Y πy(a2). We assume that π > 0.
If the stage game satisﬁes FS, then player one is never exactly sure about player two’s
action. The assumption does not, however, put any limits on the degree of imperfect moni-
toring.16
In the stage game, the payoﬀ for any player i is given by the function ri : A1 × Y → R
and depends only on publicly observed outcomes a1 and y. Let M = max{|ri(a1,y)| : i ∈
{1,2},a1 ∈ A1,y ∈ Y }. The payoﬀ function for player i is gi(a1,a2) :=
 
y∈Y ri(a1,y)πy(a2)
for (a1,a2) ∈ A1 × A2. The mixed minimax payoﬀ for player i is ˆ gi, and the pure minimax




1 ∈ A1 be such that g2(a
p
1,a2) ≤ ˆ g
p
2 for all a2 ∈ A2. The set of
feasible payoﬀs F is the convex hull of the set {g1(a1,a2),g2(a1,a2) : (a1,a2) ∈ A1×A2} ; and
the set of feasible and individually-rational payoﬀs is G = F ∩ {(g1,g2) : g1 ≥ ˆ g1,g2 ≥ ˆ g2}.
Let ¯ g1 = max{g1 : (g1,g2) ∈ G}; hence, ¯ g1 is player one’s highest payoﬀ compatible with the
players’ individual rationality (player one’s highest IR payoﬀ).
15 If player one plays a mixed action, then only the pure action that he eventually chooses is observed
publicly. The mixed action he uses is not observed.
16 In extensive-form stage games, where player one’s pure action is a full contingent plan, the perfect
monitoring assumption that we impose is stringent. This is because it requires that player one’s whole
contingent plan be observed at the end of the period. We can relax this assumption by requiring that player
one’s moves are observed perfectly while player two’s moves are observed with full-support noise. The results
we present in this paper go through with this weaker assumption, and we discuss this further in section 5.2.
6In the repeated game Γ∞, the players have perfect recall and can observe past out-
comes. The set of period t public histories is Ht = At





1 ,yt−1) for t > 0, and h0 = ∅. The set of all public histories is H =
 ∞
t=0 Ht. The set of period t private histories for player two is Ht
2 = At
1 ×At








2 ,yt−1), and H2 =
 ∞
t=0 Ht
2 is the set of all private
histories for player two. The set of private histories of player one coincides with the public
histories, i.e., Ht
1 = Ht.
2.1. Types and strategies. A behavior strategy for player i is a function σi : Hi →
∆(Ai), and Σi is the set of all behavior strategies for player i. A behavior strategy chooses
a mixed stage-game action given player i′s period t private history. A behavior strategy for
player i is a function σi : Hi → ∆(Ai) and Σi is the set of all behavior strategies for player
i.17 We use σ to denote a strategy proﬁle (σ1(N),σ2) and the set of all such strategy proﬁles
is Σ = Σ1 × Σ2.
For any strategy σ1 ∈ Σ1, H(σ1) denotes the set of public histories that are compatible
with σ1. More precisely, hT = (y0,a0
1,...,yT−1,a
T−1
1 ) ∈ H(σ1) if and only if ak
1 ∈ supp(σ1(hk))
for all k ≤ T −1, where hk is any history that is identical to the ﬁrst k periods of hT. For any
period t public history ht and for any σi ∈ Σi, the expression σi|ht denotes the continuation
strategy induced by ht. The probability measure over the set of (inﬁnite) histories induced
by (σ1,σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 is Pr(σ1,σ2).
Before time 0, nature selects player one as a normal type N or a commitment type ω,
from an at most countable set of types Ω ⊂ Σ1 ∪{N} according to a prior   that is common
knowledge. Each type ω ∈ Ω \ {N} is committed to playing the repeated-game strategy
ω ∈ Σ1. Player two is known to be a normal type with certainty and she maximizes her
expected discounted payoﬀs. Player two’s belief over player one’s types,   : H → ∆(Ω), is a
probability measure over Ω after each period t public history.
A ﬁnite automaton ω = (Θ,θ0,o,τ) consists of a ﬁnite set of states Θ, an initial state
θ0 ∈ Θ, an output function o : Θ → ∆(A1) that assigns a (possibly mixed) stage-game action
to each state, and a transition function τ : Y ×A1 ×Θ → Θ that determines the transitions
across states as a function of the outcomes of the stage game. Abusing notation, we denote
the strategy that an automaton induces by the automaton itself. For any ﬁnite automaton ω
and any history ht ∈ H(ω), θ(ht) denotes the unique state θ which is the automaton’s state
at history ht. A pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton is a ﬁnite automaton ω = (Θ,θ0,o,τ), where
the output function o is deterministic. For a ﬁnite automaton ω, a state θ ∈ Θ is recurrent
if θ is visited inﬁnitely often under the probability measure Pr(ω,σ2) for any σ2 ∈ Σ2. A ﬁnite
17For player one, any behavior strategy is also a public behavior strategy because H1 = H.
7automaton is irreducible if all of its states are recurrent (see Deﬁnition A.1 in the appendix).
For any particular commitment type ω ∈ Ω, let w(ht) = {ω′ : ω′|ht = ω|ht}; in words,
w(ht) denotes the set of types that play the same repeated-game strategy as type ω plays
after history ht. Consequently, Σ1 \ {ω} is the set of commitment types other than ω, and
Σ1 \ ω(ht) is the set of commitment types that play a strategy that is not identical to the
strategy of ω, given that history ht has been reached.
Given automaton ω = (Θ,θ0,o,τ), we say that player two’s strategy σ2 is stationary with
respect to ω if σ2(ht) = σ2(hk) for any two histories ht and hk such that θ(hk) = θ(ht) ∈ Θ,
where θ(hk) = τ(a
k−1
1 ,yk−1,θ(hk−1)) and θ(h0) = θ0. Abusing notation slightly, we will
denote a stationary strategy by a function σ2 : Θ → ∆(A2), i.e., player two plays mixed
action σ2(θ) whenever the state of ω is θ.
2.2. Payoﬀs. A player’s repeated-game payoﬀ is the normalized discounted sum of the




and ui(h−t,δ) = (1 − δ)
 ∞
k=tδk−tri(ak
1,yk), where h−t = (at
1,yt,a
t+1
1 ,yt+1,...). Player one
and player two’s expected continuation payoﬀs, following a period t public history ht and
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where Ui(ω,σ2,δ|ht) = E(ω,σ2)[ui(h−t,δ)|ht] is the expectation over continuation histories h−t
with respect to Pr(ω|ht,σ2|ht). Also, U1(σ,δ) = U1(σ,δ|h0) and U2(σ,δ, ) = U2(σ,δ, |h0).
2.3. Repeated game and equilibrium. The repeated game of complete information,
that is, the repeated game without any commitment types, with discount factor equal to
δ ∈ [0,1), is denoted as Γ∞(δ). The repeated game of incomplete information, with the
prior over the set of commitment types given by   ∈ ∆(Ω) and the discount factor equal to
δ ∈ [0,1), is denoted as Γ∞( ,δ).
The analysis in this paper focuses on Bayesian Nash equilibria (NE) of the game of incom-
plete information Γ∞( ,δ). In particular, a pair of strategies (σ1(N),σ2) ∈ Σ1 × Σ2 is a NE




1 (δ, ) = inf{U1(σ,δ) : σ ∈ NE(Γ
∞(δ, ))},
8where NE(Γ∞(δ, )) denotes the set of all NE of the repeated game Γ∞(δ, ). In words,
UNE
1 (δ, ) is player one’s the worst NE payoﬀ. Also, let UNE
1 ( ) = liminfδ→1 UNE
1 (δ, ).
Again in words, UNE
1 ( ) is the worst NE payoﬀ for a patient player one.
Remark 1 Suppose σ is a NE strategy proﬁle of Γ∞( ,δ).
(i). FS implies that if ht ∈ H(N), then Prσ(ht) > 0, that is, if ht is compatible with player
one’s strategy, then it has positive probability under σ. This is because, under FS, any
ﬁnite sequence of signals has positive probability regardless of which strategy player two
uses.
(ii). For any history ht ∈ H, if ht has positive probability under σ, that is, if Prσ(ht) > 0,
then (σ1|ht,σ2|ht) is a NE proﬁle of Γ∞( (ht),δ), where  (ht) is the posterior belief
over player one’s types given history ht.18
(iii). Consequently, if ht ∈ H(N), then (σ1(N)|ht,σ2|ht) is a NE proﬁle of Γ∞( (ht),δ), i.e.,
(σ1(N)|ht,σ2|ht) is a NE proﬁle of the continuation game.
2.4. Commitment payoﬀ and shortfall of a strategy. The commitment payoﬀ of a
repeated-game strategy σ is the payoﬀ that a patient player one can guarantee through
public commitment to this strategy. The formal deﬁnition is as follows:





t) : σ2 ∈ BR(σ1,δ)},
where BR(σ1,δ) denotes the set of best responses of player two to σ1 in the repeated game
of complete information Γ∞(δ). The commitment payoﬀ of a repeated-game strategy σ1 after
history ht is deﬁned as UC
1 (σ1|ht) = liminfδ→1 UC
1 (σ1,δ|ht).19
The shortfall of a repeated-game strategy σ is the diﬀerence between the commitment
payoﬀ of the strategy and player one’s highest IR payoﬀ. The shortfall of a commitment
type is an important concept in our analysis because, as we show, only those types with no
shortfall can facilitate successful reputation building for player one. The formal deﬁnition is
as follows:
18If a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) is used as the equilibrium concept, then (σ1(N)|ht,σ2|ht) is a
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of Γ∞( (ht),δ) for all ht ∈ H, not just for those histories that have positive
probability under the proﬁle σ, as in this remark.
19 Although we deﬁne the commitment payoﬀ using liminfδ→1 UC
1 (σ1,δ|ht), in the context of this paper
the limit limδ→1 UC
1 (σ1,δ|ht) exists.
9Definition (Shortfall) The shortfall of a repeated-game strategy σ1 is deﬁned as follows:






A type ω has no shortfall if d(ω) = 0, i.e., if the best commitment payoﬀ among all histories
for type ω is equal to player one’s highest IR payoﬀ.
If the shortfall of the commitment type ω is positive, then there is typically a range of
















(ˆ g1, ˆ g2)
P2
P1
Figure 1: Shortfall of a strategy. Player two can receive any payoﬀ between g′
2 and g′′
2 while
player one receives UC
1 (ω).
2.5. Class of stage games. Below we deﬁne the various restrictions on the set of stage
games that we will utilize in the remainder of the paper. We say a game has no gap if the
payoﬀ proﬁle where player one receives his highest IR payoﬀ is unique. The formal deﬁnition
is as follows:
Definition (No gap) Let gb
2 = max{g2 : (¯ g1,g2) ∈ G}. A stage game has no gap if
(¯ g1,g2) ∈ G implies that g2 = gb
2. Otherwise, we say that the stage game has a positive gap.
For our reputation result we assume that the stage game has no gap, an assumption that
is generically satisﬁed. The implication of the assumption is as follows: If the stage game has














(a) A game with a positive gap: there is
a range of feasible payoﬀs that player two






(ˆ g1, ˆ g2)
P2
P1
(b) A game with no gap: player two’s
feasible payoﬀs are in a narrow range if
player one’s payoﬀ is close to ¯ g1.
Figure 2: The gap of a game.
the point (¯ g1,gb
2); hence, player two’s payoﬀs are in a narrow range if player one’s payoﬀ is
close to ¯ g1. In contrast, if the stage game has a positive gap, then there is a range of payoﬀs
that are feasible and individually rational for player two if player one’s payoﬀ is equal to ¯ g1
(see ﬁgure 2).
Our main reputation result focuses on stage games that satisfy either locally nonconﬂicting
interests (LNCI) or strictly conﬂicting interests (SCI), and we denote the set of such stage
games by G. The set of games with LNCI and the set of games with SCI are mutually
exclusive. In a stage game with LNCI, in any payoﬀ proﬁle where player one receives his
highest IR payoﬀ, player two’s payoﬀ is strictly higher than her pure strategy minimax. In
contrast, a stage game has SCI if any best reply to player one’s Stackelberg action yields the
highest IR payoﬀ for player one and the minimax payoﬀ for player two. See ﬁgure 3 for some
prominent games with LNCI or SCI. Also, see ﬁgure 4 for a depiction of the set of feasible
payoﬀs for a game with LNCI or SCI.20 Although these two sets of games are quite diﬀerent,
both deliver the conditions we require for our reputation result. The formal deﬁnitions of
LNCI and SCI are as follows:
20Games with LNCI have a common-value component whereas games with SCI entail conﬂict. To see that
games with LNCI have a common-value component, notice that in ﬁgure 4a the line segment which connects
the point (ˆ g1, ˆ g2) with the point (¯ g1,g2) is strictly increasing and this line segment is on the boundary of
the set of feasible and individually rational payoﬀs. In contrast, notice in ﬁgure 4b the line segment which
connects the point (¯ g1, ˆ g2) with the point (ˆ g1,¯ g2) is strictly decreasing.
11Definition (LNCI) Locally nonconﬂicting interests: for any g ∈ G, if g1 = ¯ g1, then
g2 > ˆ g
p
2.
Definition (SCI) Strictly conﬂicting interests: there exists a1 ∈ A1 such that any best

















Figure 3: Stage games with LNCI (3a, 3b, and 3d) or SCI (3c).
We will establish our main reputation result for stage games in G with no gap. The two
main implications of these restrictions, which we utilize heavily in proving our reputation
result, are as follows: First, as we discussed above, if Γ has no gap, then player two’s payoﬀs
are in a narrow range whenever player one’s payoﬀ is close to ¯ g1. Second, if Γ is in G, i.e., if
Γ has LNCI or SCI, then there is a type ω∗ which has the following two properties:
First, ω∗ has no shortfall, that is, ω∗’s commitment payoﬀ is equal to player one’s highest
IR payoﬀ. For example, in the battle-of-the-sexes (ﬁgure 3d), ω∗ is the commitment type
which plays A in each period. Playing A is player two’s unique best response to ω∗, and
hence ω∗ is equal to player one’s highest IR payoﬀ. Second, the unit cost to a suﬃciently
patient player two of forcing a player one who is playing ω∗ to receive a payoﬀ less than ¯ g1
is strictly positive. For example, in the battle-of-the-sexes, in each period that player two
forces ω∗ to get a payoﬀ of one (which is a unit short of ¯ g1 = 2) by playing B instead of A,
she also loses a payoﬀ equal to one.
Therefore, for stage games in G with no gap we have the following: if player one’s repeated-
game payoﬀ is close to the commitment payoﬀ of ω∗ (i.e., ¯ g1), then player two’s feasible and
individually rational repeated-game payoﬀs are in a narrow range determined by linear bounds
that pass through (¯ g1,gb
2). Moreover, if player one is committed to playing strategy ω∗, then
the unit cost to a patient player two of forcing him to receive a repeated-game payoﬀ less
than ¯ g1 is strictly positive for a patient player two.
12b
b (¯ g1,g2)




(a) LNCI: the set F is bounded above
and below by the lines that go through
(¯ g1,g2).





(b) SCI: the set F is bounded above by the
downward sloping line that connects (¯ g1,ˆ g2)
to (ˆ g1,¯ g2).
Figure 4: Typical set of feasible payoﬀs for a game with LNCI (4a) or SCI (4b).
Other stage games that also feature prominently in our analysis are those where player
one can guarantee his highest IR payoﬀ by simply committing to a pure stage-game action
(i.e., a pure strong Stackelberg action). Player one has a pure strong Stackelberg action in a
stage game if there is a pure stage-game action as
1 such that player one’s public commitment
to as
1 guarantees him his highest IR payoﬀ. The following is the deﬁnition of stage games
which have pure strong Stackelberg actions:
Definition (SA) Pure strong Stackelberg action: there exists as
1 ∈ A1 such that any best
response to as
1 yields player one a payoﬀ equal to ¯ g1.
Note that if player one has a pure strong Stackelberg action in Γ, then there is a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium of Γ where player one plays the Stackelberg action as
1, player two
best responds to as
1, and player one’s payoﬀ is equal to ¯ g1. Also note that the set of stage
games that satisfy SA is a strict subset of G. The battle-of-the-sexes (ﬁgure 3d), the common-
interest game (ﬁgure 3a), and the chain-store game (ﬁgure 3c) are all SA games whereas the
principal-agent game (ﬁgure 3b) has LNCI but is not an SA game. The stage-game actions
U, F, and A are strong Stackelberg actions for the battle-of-the-sexes, the common-interest
game, and the chain-store game, respectively. In contrast, in the principal-agent game, player
one gets his highest IR payoﬀ in the action proﬁle (U,W). However, W is not a best response
to U because player two would rather play S.
The games that satisfy SA are prominent in our analysis when all of player one’s commit-
ment types are ﬁnite automata. This is because if the stage game satisﬁes SA, then there is a
13pure strategy ﬁnite automaton ω∗ with no shortfall; moreover, choosing not to best respond
to this commitment type is costly for player two. To see this, consider a game that satisﬁes
SA and the pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton that plays as
1 in each period of the repeated game.
It is straightforward to see that any best response to ω∗ gives player one a payoﬀ equal to ¯ g1,
that is, ω∗ has no shortfall. For example, in the battle-of-the-sexes (ﬁgure 3d), ω∗ plays A
in each period and player two’s unique best response to ω∗ entails playing A in each period.
Moreover, choosing not to best respond to ω∗ is strictly costly for player two. This is because
if player two plays B instead of A in any period, then she gets zero instead of one against
ω∗, i.e., the cost of choosing not to best respond is equal to one.
As we discussed above, there is a pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton with no shortfall if the
stage game satisﬁes SA. The following lemma, which is proved in appendix A, shows that
the converse is also true: if the stage game does not satisfy SA, then a pure-strategy ﬁnite
automaton with no shortfall does not exist. Nevertheless, in Theorem 1 and in section 3.3
we show that there is an inﬁnite automaton with no shortfall if the stage game is in G.
Lemma 1 Suppose that Γ satisﬁes FS and has no gap. There exists a pure strategy ﬁnite
automaton with no shortfall if and only if Γ satisﬁes SA.
For an intuition about the “only if” part of the above lemma, consider the principal-agent
game (ﬁgure 3b). Player one’s highest IR payoﬀ is equal to three in this game. If player two’s
actions were observed without noise, then player one could obtain a payoﬀ equal to three by
using the following repeated-game strategy: player one starts the game by playing U; if player
two does not play W in any period in which player one plays U, then player one punishes
player two for two periods by playing D; after the two periods of punishment, player one
again plays U. The best response of a suﬃciently patient player two to this repeated-game
strategy involves playing W in any period where player one plays U.
However, if player two’s actions are monitored with noise, then for player one to commit to
the strategy described in the previous paragraph does not necessarily guarantee him a high
payoﬀ. This is because player one cannot observe whether player two has played W or S when
he plays U but can observe only an imperfect signal. Consequently, in certain periods player
one will mistakenly punish player two, even if she played W against U; or he will mistakenly
fail to punish player two, even if she played S against U. Thus, player one cannot guarantee
a payoﬀ equal to three. The situation is also similar with any other ﬁnite automaton. Any
ﬁnite automaton ω whose commitment payoﬀ is equal to three must punish player two by
playing D if player two plays W against U. However, the ﬁnite automaton will punish player
two even if player two plays W in each period because player two’s actions are monitored
with noise. Thus, player one’s payoﬀ from strategy ω will remain strictly below three even
14if player two plays W in each period. However, even though there is no ﬁnite automaton
with no shortfall for the principal-agent game, in Theorem 1 and in section 3.3 we show that
there is always an inﬁnite automaton with no shortfall that facilitates reputation building if
the stage game is in G and, consequently, for the principal-agent game.
3. Reputation effects
In this section we present our main reputation result. Recall that the set G contains all
games that satisfy LNCI or SCI. Our main reputation result, which applies to stage games
in G that have no gap, is as follows. The proof of this theorem is in appendix B.4.
Theorem 1 Suppose that the stage game Γ is an element of G, satisﬁes FS, and has no
gap. There exists a commitment type ω∗ such that if  (ω∗) > 0 and if Ω−ω∗ is a set of ﬁnite
automata, then UNE
1 ( ) = UC
1 (ω∗) = ¯ g1.
Under the stated assumption, Theorem 1 establishes that there exists a particular com-
mitment type ω∗ such that if this commitment type is available for player one to mimic (i.e.,
 (ω∗) > 0) and if all the other commitment types are ﬁnite automata, then a patient player
one can guarantee a payoﬀ equal to the commitment payoﬀ of ω∗ in all NE. Moreover, the
commitment payoﬀ of ω∗ is equal to player one’s highest IR payoﬀ. To establish Theorem
1, we use Lemma 2 stated below. This lemma, which is proved in appendix B.3, provides a
lower bound on player one’s NE payoﬀs as a function of the commitment payoﬀ, the shortfall,
and the prior probability of any irreducible pure-strategy ﬁnite automata.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Γ satisﬁes FS and has no gap, and suppose that all the commitment




1 ( ) ≥ U
C
1 (ω) − f(ω, (ω))d(ω),
where f is a positive-valued function as deﬁned in equation (8) in the appendix, which satisﬁes
limx→0 f(ω,x) = ∞.
To better understand Lemma 2, suppose that Γ satisﬁes FS and has no gap. Also, suppose
that Ω = {N,ω∗} where ω∗ is an irreducible pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton. We will investi-
gate the implications of Lemma 2 in two cases. First, suppose that the commitment type ω∗
has no shortfall (i.e., d(ω∗) = 0 and therefore UC
1 (ω∗) = ¯ g1). In this case, if ω∗ is available
(i.e.,  (ω∗) > 0), then Lemma 2 shows that player one can guarantee his highest IR payoﬀ
15in any NE. In other words, Lemma 2 delivers a reputation result because it establishes that
UNE
1 ( ∗) ≥ UC
1 (ω∗) = ¯ g1 if ω∗ is available and if d(ω∗) = 0.
Now suppose that ω∗ has a positive shortfall (i.e., d(ω∗) > 0). In this case, the lower bound
that Lemma 2 provides is vacuous if  (ω∗) is suﬃciently small. This is because Lemma 2
implies only that UNE
1 ( ) ≥ UC
1 (ω∗) − f(ω∗, (ω∗))d(ω). However, if  (ω∗) goes to zero,
then f(ω∗, (ω∗)) approaches inﬁnity and therefore, UC
1 (ω∗) − f(ω∗, (ω∗))d(ω) approaches
negative inﬁnity.
In summary, Lemma 2 delivers a reputation result (that is, the mere availability of type
ω∗ guarantees player one a high payoﬀ in any NE) if ω∗ has no shortfall and if Γ has no gap.
Otherwise, Lemma 2 does not provide a meaningful lower bound on player one’s NE payoﬀ
when the chosen commitment type is suﬃciently unlikely. In section 4, we further explore
the cases where the shortfall for the only available commitment type is positive and the stage
game Γ has a positive gap. In particular, we show that there are PBE where player one’s
payoﬀ is near his minimax if either the shortfall of type ω∗ or the gap of Γ is positive.
As the above discussion suggests, Lemma 2 depends on the existence of a pure strategy
ﬁnite automaton with no shortfall; in turn, the existence of such a ﬁnite automaton crucially
depends on the properties of the stage game under consideration (Lemma 1). In particular, if
the stage game satisﬁes SA, then the commitment type ω∗, which plays as
1 in every period of
the repeated game, is a pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton with no shortfall. Therefore, Lemma
2 immediately delivers a reputation result for stage games with no gap that satisfy SA: if
all the commitment types are ﬁnite automata and if type ω∗ is available, then player one
can guarantee type ω∗’s commitment payoﬀ which is equal to ¯ g1 in any NE. In other words,
player one can guarantee his highest IR payoﬀ if the set of commitment types is suﬃciently
rich that ω∗ is available. For example, the set of types is suﬃciently rich if all types which
play the same action in every period are available or, more generally, if all the pure-strategy
ﬁnite automata are available. The following corollary summarizes this:
Corollary 1 Suppose that Γ satisﬁes FS and SA, and has no gap; and suppose that all
the commitment types are ﬁnite automata. Let ω∗ denote the commitment type which plays
as
1 in each period of the repeated game. If  (ω∗) > 0, then UNE
1 ( ) ≥ ¯ g1.
Proof: The shortfall d(ω∗) is equal to zero by assumption. Consequently, Lemma 2 implies
that if  (ω∗) > 0, then UNE
1 ( ) ≥ UC
1 (ω∗). However, UC
1 (ω∗) is equal to ¯ g1 because d(ω∗) is
equal to zero. ￿
For stage games that do not satisfy SA, there is no pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton which
has no shortfall (see Lemma 1). Therefore, Lemma 2 does not deliver a reputation result for
16such games. Nevertheless, our main reputation result, stated as Theorem 1, is for all stage
games in G with no gap, and not just for those which satisfy SA. These ﬁndings are reconciled
as follows: We establish the reputation result for stage games that do not satisfy SA by ﬁrst
constructing a commitment type with inﬁnitely many states that has no shortfall. We then
show that player one can guarantee this type’s commitment payoﬀ if this particular type is
available. In section 3.3 we discuss how we use Lemma 2 as an intermediate step to prove a
reputation result for stage games that do not satisfy SA.
3.1. The reputation result for the repeated common-interest game. In this sec-
tion, we provide the intuition in words and present a sketch for the proof of the reputation
result in the particular case of the repeated common-interest game (ﬁgure 5). We assume
that Ω = {ω∗,N}, where ω∗ is the type which plays U in every period. When applied to
this example, Corollary 1 implies that if  (ω∗) > 0, then UNE
1 ( ) = 1. Corollary 1 applies




Figure 5: A common-interest game. The set of public signals is Y = {l,r} and πr(L) =
πl(R) := π ∈ (0,1/2). This game satisﬁes SA because the action proﬁle (U,L) gives player
one his highest payoﬀ and because player two’s unique best response to U is L. This game
satisﬁes FS because π > 0 and 1 − π > 0.
Remark 2 In contrast to what we assume, if π = 0 in the game in ﬁgure 5, then player
two’s actions are perfectly monitored and the game does not satisfy FS. In this case, our
reputation result does not apply. In fact, Cripps and Thomas (1997) prove a folk theorem
under perfect monitoring for this game where they show that the worst perfect Bayesian
equilibrium payoﬀ for a patient player one is equal to his minimax. For more on the use of
the FS assumption, see Remark 4 below and section 5.1.
3.1.1. Verbal intuition. In order to show that a suﬃciently patient player one can guarantee
a payoﬀ equal to one in any NE, we will argue that player two plays R in only a payoﬀ-
insigniﬁcant number of periods against an opponent who repeatedly plays U.
If player one has played U in all previous periods, then player two assigns positive prob-
ability to player one being type ω∗ and therefore attaches positive probability to player one
playing U in the current period. The stage-game action L is a strict best response to U
and also weakly dominates action R. Consequently, for player two to play R after observing
17player one play U in all the previous periods, she must expect punishment in the contin-
uation game if she plays L. Player one does not observe player two’s action directly, but
observes either signal l or signal r. Hence, if player two expects punishment for playing L,
then her punishment must occur after the signal l is observed. We argue that the scope for
punishment in the continuation game is limited.
The commitment type ω∗ cannot punish player two because this type always plays U.
Therefore, any punishment for player two must occur after player one reveals rationality.
However, player one can mimic type ω∗ instead of revealing rationality; hence, his con-
tinuation payoﬀ after revealing rationality cannot diﬀer signiﬁcantly from his payoﬀ from
mimicking type ω∗. Also, because of the FS assumption, signal l is observed with positive
probability regardless of player two’s action, i.e., signal l occurs even if player two plays
R. Hence, player one’s payoﬀ after signal l cannot diﬀer signiﬁcantly from his payoﬀ from
mimicking type ω∗ either. Therefore, player one’s payoﬀ while punishing player two cannot
diﬀer signiﬁcantly from his payoﬀ from mimicking type ω∗. In other words, punishing player
two cannot be costly for player one. Because the game satisﬁes SA, the commitment payoﬀ of
type ω∗ is equal to the highest payoﬀ of player one. Moreover, because the game has no gap,
if player one’s payoﬀ is close to his highest payoﬀ, then player two’s payoﬀs are in a narrow
range (see ﬁgure 6). Therefore, if punishments are not costly for player one, then player two’s
feasible continuation payoﬀs lie in a narrow range. Thus, the scope for punishment is limited.
Player two cannot expect signiﬁcant punishment for playing L because, as we argued
above, the scope for such punishment in the continuation game is limited. Also, choosing
not to best respond to ω∗ by playing R is costly for player two. Hence, player two cannot be
incentivized to play R for a payoﬀ-signiﬁcant number of periods in any NE of the repeated
game.
3.1.2. Sketch of the proof. First, some preliminaries: Given that there is only one commit-
ment type in the example under consideration, we take the measure   ∈ [0,1] to denote the
probability that player 1 is type ω∗. Likewise, given any public history ht ∈ H, the posterior
 (ht) ∈ [0,1] denotes the probability that player 1 is type ω∗ given public history ht.
Let Uω∗(δ, ) = inf{U1(ω∗,σ2,δ) : σ2 is part of a NE strategy proﬁle of Γ∞(δ, )}, and let
Uω∗( ) = limδ→1 Uω∗(δ, ). In words, Uω∗( ) is the worst payoﬀ that a patient player one can
get if he uses strategy ω∗. Because ω∗ is always a feasible strategy for player one, we have
UNE
1 (δ, ) ≥ Uω∗(δ, ). We will show that Uω∗( ) ≥ 1.
For this sketch, we also work under the hypothesis that Uω∗(δ, ) is a nondecreasing func-
tion of   for each δ ∈ [0,1). We do this for expositional convenience as it allows us to convey
the main argument without the more technical details.21





Figure 6: The set of feasible payoﬀs for the common-interest game. The set of feasible payoﬀs
is given by the intersection of the half-spaces g1 ≥ 0, g2 ≥ −1, g2 ≤ −(1 − g1), and g2 ≥
−2(1 − g1).
Observe that if (g1,g2) is a vector of feasible payoﬀs for the common-interest game, then
g2 ≤ −(1−g1) and g2 ≥ −2(1−g1) (see ﬁgure 6). The set of feasible stage-game payoﬀs and
the set of feasible repeated-game payoﬀs coincide because the two players share a common
discount factor. For any pair (σ1,σ2) ∈ Σ1×Σ2, the vector (U1(σ1,σ2,δ),U2(σ1,σ2,δ)) belongs
to the set of feasible payoﬀs; it follows that
(1) −2(1 − U1(σ1,σ2,δ)) ≤ U2(σ1,σ2,δ) ≤ −(1 − U1(σ1,σ2,δ)).
Remark 3 In this repeated game, the commitment payoﬀ of type ω∗ is equal to one. There-
fore, if player one’s NE payoﬀ is close to the commitment payoﬀ of type ω∗, i.e., if it is close to
one, then player two’s payoﬀ conditional on facing player one’s normal type, U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ),
is in a narrow range determined by inequality (1). For example, if the diﬀerence between
player one’s NE payoﬀ and the commitment payoﬀ of type ω∗ is equal to ǫ, then player two’s
payoﬀ conditional on facing player one’s normal type is between −2ǫ and −ǫ.
We now use inequality (1) to establish an upper bound on player two’s NE payoﬀ in the
following claim:
Claim 1 For any   ∈ [0,1] and any NE strategy proﬁle σ of the repeated common-interest
game Γ∞(δ, ), player two’s NE equilibrium payoﬀ satisﬁes the following inequality:
U2(σ,δ, ) ≤ − (1 − U1(ω
∗,σ2,δ)).
which is nondecreasing by deﬁnition.
19Proof: Let σ = (σ1(N),ω∗,σ2) be a NE strategy proﬁle and recall that U1(σ,δ) =
U1(σ1(N),σ2,δ). Inequality 1 implies that U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ) ≤ −(1 − U1(σ,δ)). Moreover,
U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ) ≤ −(1 − U1(σ,δ)) ≤ 0 because player one’s highest feasible payoﬀ is one.
Inequality (1) also implies that
U2(ω
∗,σ2,δ) ≤ −(1 − U1(ω
∗,σ2,δ)). (2)
Player two’s NE payoﬀ U2(σ,δ, ) is equal to  U2(ω∗,σ2,δ)+(1− )U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ). There-
fore, (2) and U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ) ≤ 0 together prove the result. ￿
For the next claim, consider a NE σ of the repeated game Γ∞( ,δ). Suppose that player
one has played U in each period before t. Further suppose that player one plays D with
positive probability in period t. Also, let player one’s reputation level be  ′ ≥   at the
start of period t+1, if he plays U instead of D. In the next claim we show that player two’s
continuation payoﬀ, after any realization of the period t public signal, is bounded from below
by a linear function of 1−Uω∗( ′,δ). The argument for the claim is as follows: If player one
is playing D with positive probability, then his payoﬀ from playing D must be at least as
large as his payoﬀ from playing U. However, if player one plays U, then he ensures that his
reputation is  ′ at the start of the subsequent period, and thus guarantees a continuation
payoﬀ of Uω∗( ′,δ) in period t + 1. Given this lower bound on player one’s continuation
payoﬀ, the lower bound on player two’s continuation payoﬀ follows from inequality (1).
Claim 2 Let σ be any NE strategy proﬁle of the repeated common-interest game Γ∞(δ, ).
Suppose that public history ht has positive probability under the NE strategy proﬁle σ and
that  (ht) > 0. Suppose also that player one plays D with positive probability in period t.
Then U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht,D,l) ≥ −2(1−Uω∗(δ, ′))/π, and U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht,D,r) ≥ −2(1−
Uω∗(δ, ′))/π, for any  ′ ≤  (ω∗|ht,U,l) =  (ω∗|ht,U,r).
Proof: Let πt
y denote the probability that signal y ∈ {l,r} is observed after period t
conditional on history ht.22 If player one plays D in period t, then his payoﬀ for period t is
at most 1/2 and his continuation payoﬀ is equal to πt
lU1(σ,δ|ht,D,l) + πt
rU1(σ,δ|ht,D,r).
Alternatively, player one can play U forever, that is, he can use strategy ω∗. If player one
plays strategy ω∗ from period t onwards, then his payoﬀ in period t is at least 1/2, and his
continuation payoﬀ is at least πt
lUω∗(δ, (ω∗|ht,U,l)) + πt
rUω∗(δ, (ω∗|ht,U,r)). By Remark
1, the strategy proﬁle (σ1|ht,σ2|ht) is a NE of the continuation game. Because (σ1|ht,σ2|ht)
is a NE of the continuation game and because player one plays D with positive probability
22The probability πt
y is calculated using player two’s NE strategy σ2, conditional on history ht.
20in period t, his repeated game payoﬀ from playing D in period t must be at least as large as
















Also, Uω∗(δ, (ω∗|ht,U,l)) = Uω∗(δ, (ω∗|ht,U,r)) ≥ UNE
1 (δ, ′) because  ′ ≥  (ω∗|ht,U,l) =
 (ω∗|ht,U,r) and because UNE







t,D,r) ≥ Uω∗(δ, 
′).







t,D,r)) ≤ 1 − Uω∗(δ, 
′).
Because player one’s highest payoﬀ in the game is equal to one, 1 − U1(σ,δ|ht,D,y) is




t,D,y)) ≤ 1 − Uω∗(δ, 
′),
for any y ∈ {r,l}. Also, our assumption that πt
y ≥ π > 0 for any y ∈ {r,l}, i.e., the FS
assumption, implies that
(3) 1 − U1(σ,δ|h
t,D,y) ≤ (1 − Uω∗(δ, 
′))/π ,
for any y ∈ {r,l}. However, because (U1(σ,δ|ht,D,y),U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht,D,y)) is a feasible
payoﬀ vector for any y ∈ {r,l}, we can derive the following inequality from inequalities (1)
and (3):
U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|h
t,D,y) ≥ −2(1 − Uω∗(δ, 
′))/π,
for any y ∈ {r,l}. ￿
Remark 4 Notice that if the FS assumption is not satisﬁed, i.e., if π = 0, then the lower
bound given by Claim 2 is not well deﬁned. For example, suppose that FS is not satisﬁed
by the stage game. Also, suppose that πt
l = 0, i.e., signal l occurs with zero probability after
history ht. In this case, following the reasoning in Claim 2 does not deliver a lower bound
on player two’s continuation payoﬀ after public history (ht,D,l) because this history occurs
with probability zero on the equilibrium path. See section 5.1 for more on the use of the FS
21assumption.
Fix any arbitrary reputation level   > 0. Starting in the next paragraph below, we use
Claims 1 and 2 to show that
(4) 1 − Uω∗( ) ≤
4 
π
(1 − Uω∗( 
′))
for any two reputation levels  ′ ≥   ≥   such that  / ′ ≥ 1 − q, where q := π /4. Once we
establish inequality (4), a reputation result for the common-interest game follows. This is
because inequality (4) and Uω∗(1) = 1 together imply that Uω∗( ′) ≥ 1 for all  ′ ≥   > 0. To
see this, pick a nonincreasing sequence of numbers { n}N
n=0 such that  0 = 1,  N =  , and
 n+1/ n ≥ 1−q for each n. We will run induction on n to show that Uω∗( N) = Uω∗( ) = 1.
Notice that  0 = 1 and Uω∗( 0) ≥ 1. Now make the induction hypothesis that Uω∗( ′) ≥ 1 for
all  ′ ≥  n ≥  . For  ′ =  n and   ∈ [ n+1, n), inequality (4) and the induction hypothesis
together imply that Uω∗( ) ≥ 1, the induction is thus completed. Therefore, for any   ≥  ,
we have Uω∗( ) ≥ 1. Since our initial choice of   is arbitrary, we ﬁnd that Uω∗( ) ≥ 1 for
any   > 0.
Now we turn to establishing inequality (4). Suppose that   ≥  . Consider a NE σ of the
repeated common-interest game Γ∞(δ, ) where player one’s payoﬀ from using strategy ω∗,
U1(ω∗,σ2,δ), is equal to Uω∗(δ, )+ǫ.23 By Claim 1, player two’s NE payoﬀ U2(σ,δ, ) is less
than or equal to − (1−Uω∗(δ, )−ǫ). We will establish inequality (4) by using the fact that
the NE strategy σ2 must give player two a payoﬀ that is at least as great as the payoﬀ from
using an alternative strategy that is available to her. We consider the alternative strategy for
player two that plays L until player one plays D for the ﬁrst time and then reverts back to
the equilibrium strategy σ2.
Lower bound on player two’s payoﬀ from using the alternative strategy. Suppose that
player one’s initial reputation level is equal to   >  . Choose any reputation level  ′ that is
greater than   and that satisﬁes  / ′ ≥ 1 − q. Let τ denote the ﬁrst period in which player
one’s reputation level exceeds  ′ if player one plays according to strategy ω∗ and player two
uses the alternative strategy. We will provide a bound on player two’s payoﬀ conditional
on one of the following three mutually exclusive and exhaustive events occurring: First, the
event that player one plays U in every period of the repeated game. Second, the event that
player one plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period k < τ − 1; the probability of this event
is at most q, by the deﬁnition of τ, Bayes’ rule, and the choice of  ′. Third, the event that
player one plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period k ≥ τ − 1; the probability of this event
23For each ǫ > 0, such a NE exists because Uω∗(δ, ) is deﬁned as the inﬁmum over the set of NE proﬁles.
22is at most 1 − q.
If player one plays U in every period, i.e., if the ﬁrst event occurs, then player two’s payoﬀ
from using the alternative strategy is equal to zero.
Alternatively, suppose that player one plays D for the ﬁrst time in some period k, i.e.,
either the second or the third event occurs. Player two receives zero in each period up to
period k, because she plays L and player one plays U in each such period. In period k, she
receives −(1−δ), because she plays L and player one plays D. If k < τ −1, i.e., if the second
event occurs, then player two receives at least −2(1 − Uω∗(δ, ))/π as a continuation payoﬀ
after period k. This follows from Claim 2 because player one’s reputation is at least   if he
plays U in period k. If k ≥ τ − 1, i.e., if the third event occurs, then player two receives at
least −2(1 − Uω∗(δ, ′))/π as a continuation payoﬀ after period k. This follows from Claim
2 because player one’s reputation is at least  ′ if he plays U in period k. Consequently, if
player two uses the alternative strategy, then her payoﬀ is at least
−δ
k(1 − δ) −
2δk+1
π
(q(1 − Uω∗(δ, )) + (1 − q)(1 − Uω∗(δ, 
′)).
Simplifying this expression by using the fact that δ < 1 and 1 − q < 1 shows that player
two’s payoﬀ from using the alternative strategy is at least
−(1 − δ) −
2
π
(q(1 − Uω∗(δ, )) + (1 − Uω∗(δ, 
′)).
Establishing inequality (4). Player two’s payoﬀ from her NE strategy σ2 must be at least
as great as her payoﬀ from the alternative strategy. Therefore,
−(1 − δ) −
2
π
(q(1 − Uω∗(δ, )) + (1 − Uω∗(δ, 
′))) ≤ − (1 − Uω∗(δ, ) + ǫ).
By rearranging, we obtain:
(  − 2q/π)(1 − Uω∗(δ, )) ≤ (1 − δ) +  ǫ +
2
π
(1 − Uω∗(δ, 
′).
As this inequality holds for any ǫ > 0, we have
(  − 2q/π)(1 − Uω∗(δ, )) ≤ (1 − δ) +
2
π
(1 − Uω∗(δ, 
′).
Because the above inequality holds for every δ ∈ [0,1) and because   ≤  , we ﬁnd that
(  − 2q/π)(1 − Uω∗( )) ≤ (2/π)(1 − Uω∗( 
′)).
23Substituting π /4 for q, we obtain the following inequality:
1 − Uω∗( ) ≤ (4 /π)(1 − Uω∗( 
′)).
3.2. Other commitment types. So far our discussion of Theorem 1, Lemma 2, and
Corollary 1 has focused on the case where Ω = {N,ω∗} for simplicity. However, as is evident
in the statement of these results, we do not require that Ω = {N,ω∗}. More speciﬁcally,
we place no restriction on the other commitment types beyond requiring that they be ﬁnite
automata. In the proof of Lemma 2, we achieve this in the following way: First, we show that
if player two assigns a small probability to the event that player one’s type is in the set Ω−ω∗,
then the eﬀect of the types in Ω−ω∗ on player one’s NE payoﬀ is also small. Second, we show
that if all the other commitment types are ﬁnite automata, and if player one mimics type ω∗
for a suﬃciently long number of periods t, then with large probability, player two’s posterior
belief that player one’s type is in Ω−ω∗, i.e.,  (Ω−ω∗|ht), becomes arbitrarily small. More
importantly, the rate at which such learning occurs is independent of player two’s strategy.
Thus, by combining these two ﬁndings, we conclude that the presence of other commitment
types does not disrupt our reputation result.
Our second ﬁnding (i.e., that if player one mimics type ω∗, then player two learns that
player one is not playing a strategy in Ω−ω∗ at a uniform rate) plays a crucial role in our
reputation result (see Lemma A.2 in the appendix). We now give the intuition for this
second result. The following statements are true, regardless of which strategy player two uses,
because of the FS assumption: Each recurrent state of any ﬁnite automata will be visited
inﬁnitely often. Thus, player two will observe player one’s action at each state inﬁnitely often.
Therefore, if player one plays according to ω∗, then player two can reject the hypothesis
that the observed sequence of play is generated by any ﬁnite automata other than ω∗ with
arbitrarily high probability. Moreover, learning occurs at a uniform rate because all the
commitment types have ﬁnitely many states.
3.3. Reputation eﬀects in stage games that do not satisfy SA. The proof of Theo-
rem 1 shows that, for any stage-game in G with no gap which does not satisfy SA, again there
exists a commitment type with no shortfall. In this case, however, the commitment type ω∗
is an automaton with an inﬁnite number of states. Moreover, Theorem 1 demonstrates that
player one can guarantee a payoﬀ equal to ¯ g1 by simply mimicking ω∗. In this section, we
sketch how we construct this commitment type by describing ω∗ for the principle-agent game
which does not satisfy SA (ﬁgure 3b).
As a ﬁrst step in describing the inﬁnite automaton ω∗, we describe a ﬁnite automaton
ωǫ which plays a review strategy with shortfall ǫ > 0 (see also Radner (1981, 1985) and
24Celentani et al. (1996)). The ﬁnite automaton ωǫ has two phases: a review phase and a
punishment phase. Each review phase lasts for J(ǫ) periods and the automaton plays U
in each period of the review phase. Each punishment phase lasts for 2J(ǫ) periods and the
automaton plays D in each period of the punishment phase. The automaton begins the game
in the review phase. If player one’s average payoﬀ in a review phase is at least 3−ξ(ǫ), where
ξ(ǫ) > 0 is the cutoﬀ value for the review, then ωǫ enters a new review phase. Otherwise, ωǫ
moves to a punishment phase and plays D, i.e., minimaxes player two, for 2J(ǫ) periods. At
the end of that punishment phase, the automaton again returns to a review phase.
Notice that, had there been perfect monitoring, a patient player two who faces ωǫ would
have strictly preferred playing W in each period in order to avoid ever entering the punish-
ment phase. Under imperfect monitoring a patient player two’s incentives are similar to the
case of perfect monitoring, but only for appropriately chosen J(ǫ) and ξ(ǫ). In particular,
for any ǫ, we pick the length J(ǫ) of the review stage and the cutoﬀ value ξ(ǫ) such that a
suﬃciently patient player two’s best response to ωǫ entails entering the punishment phase
after a review phase with arbitrarily small probability; a patient player one’s repeated game
payoﬀ is thus at least 3 − ǫ.24 In other words, the commitment payoﬀ of ωǫ is at least 3 − ǫ.
The type ω∗ ﬁrst plays T1 repetitions of a review strategy with shortfall ǫ where each
repetition includes the review phase and, if it is triggered, the subsequent punishment phase.
Then ω∗ plays T2 repetitions of the review strategy with shortfall ǫ/2, and then Tn repetitions
of the review strategy with shortfall ǫ/n; and so on. As δ approaches one, the commitment
payoﬀ of type ω∗ converges to three, i.e., the shortfall of ω∗ is equal to zero. This is because,
for any n ≥ 1, the initial periods in which ω∗ plays a review strategy with a shortfall more
than ǫ/n become payoﬀ-irrelevant as the discount factor approaches one.
The choice of how many repetitions Tn are played by ω∗ of each review strategy with
shortfall ǫ/n is delicate. In the appendix, we make the choices in a way that ensures that
our reputation result applies. Intuitively, we choose the number of repetitions to ensure the
following three conditions hold: ﬁrst, UC
1 (ω∗,δ) is increasing in δ; second, the cost of not best
responding to this type is strictly positive for any δ; third, player two can distinguish the
strategy of ω∗ from any ﬁnite automaton’s strategy regardless of which strategy she plays.
4. Nonreputation results
Now we turn our focus to the following two questions: Which types, if available, facilitate
reputation building for player one? In which strategic situations (i.e., for which class of stage
games) can player one successfully build a reputation? In addressing these questions, we
restrict attention to pure-strategy ﬁnite automata.25 Under this restriction, we show that (i)
24See Celentani et al. (1996) which shows that J(ǫ) and ξ can indeed be chosen in this way.
25We expand on the limitations of this restriction at the end of this section.
25only types with no shortfall facilitate successful reputation building (Theorem 2), and (ii)
player one can build a reputation only in SA games (Theorem 3).
We say that player one cannot successfully build a reputation (i.e., that there are no rep-
utation eﬀects) in the repeated game Γ∞ given a set of commitment types Ω if we can ﬁnd
a prior with full support   over Ω such that a patient player one’s worst equilibrium payoﬀ
is arbitrarily close to his worst equilibrium in the repeated game of complete information.
Or conversely, there are reputation eﬀects if a patient player one’s worst NE payoﬀ under
incomplete information is uniformly greater than his worst NE payoﬀ under complete in-
formation. More intuitively, there are reputation eﬀects if adding even a small amount of
incomplete information improves a patient player one’s worst NE payoﬀ signiﬁcantly. We
continue our analysis by considering repeated games in which player one’s worst NE pay-
oﬀ is his minimax in the benchmark model with complete information. Thus, we make the
following assumption:
Assumption (NI) Non-empty interior: The set F has a non-empty interior and there
exists a payoﬀ g2 such that (ˆ g1,g2) ∈ G.26
Therefore, the formal deﬁnition of no reputation eﬀects is as follows:
Definition (No reputation eﬀects) We say that there are no reputation eﬀects in Γ∞,
given a set of commitment types Ω, if for each ǫ > 0, there exists   ∈ ∆◦(Ω) and δ∗ ∈ [0,1)
such that for any δ ≥ δ∗, there is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) σ of Γ∞(δ, ) where
U1(σ,δ) < ˆ g1 + ǫ.
The following theorem, which is proved in appendix C, shows that commitment types with
a shortfall cannot facilitate successful reputation building.
Theorem 2 (Reputation eﬀects are all-or-nothing) Suppose Γ satisﬁes NI. Suppose also
that Ω = {N,ω} where ω is a pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton. If the shortfall of ω is positive,
then there are no reputation eﬀects in Γ∞.
Suppose that the stage game has no gap. In this case Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 together
fully characterize the set of pure-strategy ﬁnite automata that facilitate successful reputation
26The ﬁrst part of the assumption, namely that the set of feasible payoﬀs has a non-empty interior (i.e,
the full dimensionality condition) is standard in folk theorems (see, for instance, Fudenberg et al. (1994)).
This ﬁrst part is the core of the assumption. The second part of NI requires that there exists a payoﬀ g2 such
that (ˆ g1,g2) ∈ G. This part is for expositional purposes. If F has a non-empty interior but there exists no
g2 such that (ˆ g1,g2) ∈ G, then the goal of Theorem 2 would be to establish that a patient player one’s worst
NE payoﬀ is equal to his lowest payoﬀ compatible with both players’ individual rationality. This payoﬀ can,
in general, exceed his minimax.
26building for player one. In particular, suppose that Ω = {N,ω} where ω is a pure-strategy
ﬁnite automaton. Then Lemma 2 and Theorem 2 together imply that there are reputation
eﬀects in Γ∞ if and only if ω has no shortfall.
It is also instructive to contrast Theorem 2 with reputation results obtained in repeated
games with asymmetric discounting. If player two is less patient than player one, then player
one’s worst NE payoﬀ is equal to the commitment payoﬀ of type ω. Therefore, there are
reputation eﬀects as long as ω’s commitment payoﬀ strictly exceeds player one’s minimax
(see Celentani et al. (1996), or Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992)). In contrast, Theorem 2
shows that a pure-strategy ﬁnite-automaton commitment type facilitates reputation building
only if the type has no shortfall. Moreover, the lower bound attained with such a type is
player one’s highest IR payoﬀ. Hence, player one guarantees either his highest IR payoﬀ or
his lowest payoﬀ.
The following theorem shows that a pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton can facilitate reputa-
tion building only in repeated SA games.
Theorem 3 Suppose Γ satisﬁes FS and NI. Suppose also that Ω = {N,ω}, where ω is any
pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton. If Γ does not satisfy SA, then there are no reputation eﬀects
in Γ∞.
The proof of Theorem 3 follows from Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, taken together with the
following lemma, which is proved in appendix C.
Lemma 3 Suppose Γ satisﬁes NI but does not satisfy SA. Suppose also that Ω = {N,ω}
where ω is a pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton. If the gap of Γ is positive, then there are no
reputation eﬀects in Γ∞. 27
Proof of Theorem 3: If Γ does not satisfy SA, then either Γ has a positive gap, or ω
has a positive shortfall. This follows from Lemma 1. However, if ω has a positive shortfall,
then Theorem 2 implies that there are no reputation eﬀects. Alternatively, if Γ has a positive
gap, then Lemma 3 implies that there are no reputation eﬀects. ￿
For stage games with no gap, Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 together fully characterize the
games in which player one can successfully build a reputation by mimicking a pure-strategy
ﬁnite automaton. To see this, suppose that Γ has no gap. Suppose also that Ω = {N,ω},
where ω is an arbitrary pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton. Notice that if the stage game sat-
isﬁes SA, then there is a ﬁnite automaton ω∗ with no shortfall and consequently there are
27In fact, a stronger result holds, as follows: Suppose Γ satisﬁes NI but is not a strictly dominant action
game. Suppose also that Ω = {N,ω} where ω is a pure-strategy ﬁnite automaton. If the gap of Γ is positive,
then there are no reputation eﬀects in Γ∞
27reputation eﬀects if ω = ω∗. In contrast, if the stage game does not satisfy SA, then there
does not exist a ﬁnite automaton with no shortfall. Therefore, there are reputation eﬀects
for some pure strategy ﬁnite automaton if and only if the game satisﬁes SA.
Notice also that if the stage game satisﬁes SA, then the ﬁnite automaton that plays
the strong Stackelberg action in every period has no shortfall. Moreover, player one can
guarantee his highest IR payoﬀ by simply mimicking this type. Hence, whenever player one
can successfully build a reputation, he can do so by mimicking the least complex commitment
type that plays the strong Stackelberg action in each period; in other words, added complexity
does not improve a patient player one’s worst payoﬀ as long as the complexity is still ﬁnite.
In proving Theorem 2 and 3 we restricted attention to pure-strategy ﬁnite automata.
The reasons we restrict attention to pure strategies were discussed in the introduction; our
restriction to ﬁnite automata in Theorem 2 is mainly for technical convenience, and the
ﬁniteness of the automaton does not play a crucial role in the argument. We anticipate that
an argument along similar lines would establish a nonreputation result for more complicated
types that have a shortfall which is uniformly bounded away from zero after any history.28
In contrast, in Theorem 3 the restriction to ﬁnite automata is a substantive assumption. As
we showed previously, there are reputation eﬀects in stage games in G that are not SA games
if we allow player one to mimic an automaton with an inﬁnite number of states (see section
3.3). In section 5.3, we further discuss reputation eﬀects outside the class G.
4.1. The intuition for Theorem 2 and Lemma 3. The intuition for Theorem 2 and
Lemma 3 is identical and is as follows: If the stage game has a positive gap or the commitment
strategy has a positive shortfall, then NI and the folk theorem in Fudenberg et al. (1994)
imply that in the complete information repeated game there is a wide range of PBE payoﬀs
for player two that are all consistent with player one receiving his commitment payoﬀ UC
1 (ω).
Player one can use this range to credibly reveal rationality, still receive a payoﬀ equal to his
commitment payoﬀ, and credibly punish or reward player two in the continuation game of
complete information.
We construct an equilibrium in which player one mimics the commitment type for a long
number of periods that are payoﬀ-relevant and player two plays an action that gives player
one a low payoﬀ during these periods (the review phase). The action that player two plays in
each period of the review phase is potentially a myopic non best response. We show that both
players are incentivized to adhere to this equilibrium, given their equilibrium continuation
payoﬀs. At the end of the review phase, player one reveals his rationality, and receives his
commitment payoﬀ in the continuation game. Hence, player one can do at least as well by
28However, the argument is likely to be more cumbersome since the stationarity that the ﬁnite automata
provides is lost with a more complicated commitment type.
28revealing rationality instead of continuing to mimic the commitment type. After player one
reveals rationality, player two receives a high continuation payoﬀ if player one’s realized
payoﬀ during the review phase was low, but receives a low continuation payoﬀ otherwise.
Because the review phase is suﬃciently long to be payoﬀ relevant, player one’s payoﬀ is
strictly lower than his commitment payoﬀ.
In the remaining steps of the construction, we ensure that player one’s equilibrium payoﬀ
is close to his minimax payoﬀ if the commitment type is suﬃciently unlikely. Moreover, we
apply an appropriate law of large numbers to overcome the technical diﬃculties introduced
by imperfect monitoring. We sketch our construction for a particular example in the next
subsection.
Notice that our construction relies heavily on the fact that there is a range of payoﬀs for
player two that is consistent with player one receiving UC
1 (ω) in the periods where player
one reveals his rationality. This property is a consequence of either a positive shortfall or
a positive gap. If the strategy had no shortfall and the game had no gap, then there is a
unique payoﬀ for player two which is consistent with player one receiving UC
1 (ω). We now
describe why our construction would not work in this case. First consider the scenario where
player one’s continuation payoﬀ is equal to UC
1 (ω). In this scenario, player two receives her
unique payoﬀ consistent with UC
1 (ω) in the continuation game regardless of what she plays
in the initial periods. But then player two would prefer to play a best response to ω during
the initial periods in which player one mimics ω. Second, consider the scenario where player
one’s continuation payoﬀ is strictly lower than UC
1 (ω). In this scenario, there is a range of
continuation payoﬀs for player two that are feasible. Moreover, this range can be utilized
to provide incentives for player two to play a non best response to ω during the initial
periods in which player one mimics ω. However, in this scenario player one would never
reveal rationality as required by our construction. This is because he can always guarantee
UC
1 (ω) in the continuation game by mimicking ω.
4.2. Sketch of the construction. We use the game in ﬁgure 7 to illustrate the con-
struction of an equilibrium in which player one’s payoﬀ is close to his minimax, which is
zero in this game.29 This game has a positive gap. Consider the repeated game with types
Ω = {N,ω} where ω plays U at every period. The commitment payoﬀ of ω is 1.
For an arbitrarily chosen constant ε > 0, we will choose a cutoﬀ reputation level z∗ and
a cutoﬀ discount factor δ∗, and will construct a public PBE where player one’s payoﬀ is at
most ε for any repeated game Γ( ,δ) where δ > δ∗ and  (ω) < z∗.
Deﬁne v > 0 such that for every g∗
1 ∈ (ε,1], there are two payoﬀ proﬁles (g∗
1,g′
2) ∈ G and
29This construction is similar to the construction presented in Cripps and Thomas (2003).
29L R M
U 1,1 0,0 0,0
D 0,0 1,1/2 0,0
M 0,0 0,0 0,0
Figure 7: A game with a positive gap.
(g∗
1,g′′
2) ∈ G such that v ≤ g′′
2 − g′
2. Hence, the range of player two’s payoﬀs is at least v
if player one’s payoﬀ is greater than ε. In the game under consideration, v can be taken to
equal ε/2. More generally, if the stage game has a positive gap and satisﬁes NI, then such a
v > 0 exists.
We describe the equilibrium behavior of player one explicitly at histories where he has
not yet revealed his rationality. At all other histories, we will not be explicit about his
choice of action, but will instead pick the continuation equilibrium payoﬀs from the complete
information repeated game’s set of equilibrium payoﬀs. The equilibrium path of play where
player one has not yet revealed his rationality consists of blocks, each of length T ∗. We
numerate the blocks so that block one is the last block, block two is the second-to-last block,
and similarly for the rest of the blocks. Observable deviations from the prescribed behavior
along the blocks will oblige player one to reveal his rationality and will trigger an indeﬁnite
repetition of (M,M). This ensures that observable deviations are not proﬁtable as long as
player one’s equilibrium payoﬀ along the blocks is always bounded away from zero and the
players are suﬃciently patient, as will be the case.
Block Structure: Each block consists of two phases: the ﬁrst T ∗ − 1 periods of the block
constitute the review phase, and period T ∗ within the block is the revelation period. Player
one plays U during the review phase. In a revelation period, player one plays, with equal
probability, U or D. If player one plays U in the revelation period a block k > 0, then block
k − 1 starts. If he plays U in the revelation period of block 1, then the continuation play
is the indeﬁnite play of (U,L). If player one plays D in any revelation period, then the two
players play an equilibrium of the complete information repeated game with a payoﬀ proﬁle
that we will specify below.
Incentives of player two: Fix a small number e > 0. We now pick continuation payoﬀs
such that player two is incentivized to ensure that player one’s payoﬀ for the review phase
is below e with probability at least 1 − e.




2 (k,δ)) if player one plays D and if player one’s discounted average
payoﬀ during the review phase is below e; it is equal to (urev
1 (k,δ),u
fail
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plays D but player one’s discounted average payoﬀ during the review phase is greater than e.




2 (k,δ) > v. Intuitively, if player one reveals rationality at
the end of the block, then player two enjoys a high continuation payoﬀ if player one’s realized
payoﬀ for the review phase is low, i.e., if she passes the review; but her continuation payoﬀ
is low otherwise. However, pushing player one’s payoﬀ below e requires player two to play
a myopic nonbestresponse during the review phase. Therefore, player two faces a tradeoﬀ
between her payoﬀ in the review phase and her continuation payoﬀ. If the probability that
player one is the commitment type at the start of block k is below a certain cutoﬀ ¯ z, then
a patient player two’s best response to the block strategy of player one would bring player
one’s payoﬀs below e with high probability.
The length of the review stage T ∗ is chosen such that δT∗ = r where r ∈ ( 2
2+v(1−¯ z),1) is
an arbitrary constant. Also, if δ exceeds a cutoﬀ δ(e), then the length of the review stage
T ∗ ensures that player two’s best response to player one’s block strategy gives player one a
discounted average payoﬀ of more than e with a probability less than e (see Appendix C.6).30
Iteration over blocks and continuation payoﬀs: Since the choice of e was arbitrary, if player
one’s reputation level at the beginning of block one is less than ¯ z, then a patient player one’s
equilibrium payoﬀ at that period is at most r. If r < ε, then an equilibrium construction in
which there is a single block achieves our desiderata.
If r ≥ ε, then consider the continuation payoﬀ of player one at the revelation period of block
two. Suppose that player one’s reputation level at the beginning of block two is z2. Moreover,
suppose that if he plays U in the revelation period, i.e., does not reveal his rationality, then
his reputation level is z1 < ¯ z.31 Let u1(block1,δ) denote player one’s continuation payoﬀ at
the start of the last block, i.e, block 1. If player one plays U in the revelation period of
block 2, then his current period payoﬀ is 1 − δ and his continuation payoﬀ is δu1(block1,δ).
Alternatively, if he plays D, then his current period payoﬀ is zero and his continuation payoﬀ
is δurev
1 (δ). We choose urev
1 (2,δ) to ensure that player one is indiﬀerent between playing U and
D in the revelation period, and hence, urev
1 (2,δ) = u1(block1,δ)+(1−δ)/δ. Notice that for δ
close to one, urev
1 (2,δ) is above ε and in the interior of the feasible and IR payoﬀ set. Therefore,







> 1 − δT
∗
,
and if T ∗ exceeds a cutoﬀ T(e) that only depends on e, then player two’s best to player one’s block strategy
gives player one a discounted average payoﬀ of more than e with a probability less than e. For any δ, we pick
T ∗ such that δT
∗
= r < 1, and we pick z for which inequality (5) is satisﬁed. Notice if δ exceeds a cutoﬀ,
then the T ∗ chosen in this manner exceeds T(e). Notice also that inequality (5) is independent of the choice
of e.
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fail
2 (2,δ) ≥ v if δ is
suﬃciently large. For this reason, a patient player two’s best response delivers to player one
a payoﬀ of more than e during the review phase of block 2, with a probability at most e .
Again, since e is arbitrary, a patient player one’s payoﬀ at the beginning of block two is at
most r2.
Iterating this procedure k times and ratcheting down the reputation levels zk, we can thus
construct an equilibrium where a patient player one’s payoﬀ is no more than ε. The number
of iterations is at most equal to the smallest integer k∗ such that rk∗ ≤ ε. Hence, if a patient
player one’s initial reputation level is below zk∗, then there is an equilibrium in which player
one’s payoﬀ is at most ε.
5. Discussion
5.1. Full-support imperfect monitoring. In order to further motivate the use of the FS
assumption, we contrast our reputation result for the common-interest game in ﬁgure 5 with
the folk theorem of Cripps and Thomas (1997) for this game under perfect monitoring. The
equilibrium construction in Cripps and Thomas (1997) is as follows: In the ﬁrst K periods,
as long as player one has not revealed rationality, player two plays R and player one uses a
mixed strategy that plays D with small probability on the equilibrium path. After the ﬁrst
K periods, if player one has not revealed rationality, then (L,U) is played forever. If player
one reveals rationality on the equilibrium path during the ﬁrst K periods, then continuation
payoﬀs are chosen to equal player one’s continuation payoﬀ had he not revealed rationality.
To ensure that player two has an incentive to play R, she is punished if she deviates by
playing L, and the public signal (l,D) is observed. Notice that because of perfect monitoring,
player two is punished with certainty in the event that player one reveals rationality. Pun-
ishment entails a continuation payoﬀ for player two that is close to her minimax.32 Because
player two only plays R on the equilibrium path, player one is indiﬀerent between playing
U and D in the ﬁrst K periods. In this construction, player two is deterred from playing
L, even if player one reveals rationality with a small probability in each period, because her
continuation payoﬀ is close to her minimax if public signal (l,D) is observed. However, if
the probability that player one reveals rationality is small in each period, then it takes many
periods for player one to build a reputation and K can be chosen large to ensure low payoﬀs
for both players.
This argument hinges on choosing low continuation payoﬀs for player two after public
signal (l,D), during the ﬁrst K periods. This does not conﬂict with player one’s incentive
to play D instead of U, even if low continuation payoﬀs for player two also imply low
32 After (l,D) or (r,D), the continuation game is a repeated game of complete information and any
individually rational payoﬀ can be supported in equilibrium.
32continuation payoﬀs for player one, after (l,D). This is because, in the ﬁrst K periods, player
one expects player two to play L with probability zero and hence expects the public signal
(l,D) to occur with probability zero. Thus, payoﬀs after public signal (l,D) have no eﬀect
on player one’s ex-ante incentive to play D; consequently, player one’s incentive constraint
puts no restrictions on player two’s continuation payoﬀ after (l,D). In contrast, if the FS
assumption is satisﬁed, then, as shown in Claim 2 and discussed in Remark 4, player one’s
incentive constraint implies a bound on player two’s continuation payoﬀ after any signal
realization, i.e., player one’s incentive to play D instead of U imposes a bound on the amount
of punishment that player two can expect after choosing L. This is because the signal l occurs
with positive probability regardless of which action player two chooses.
5.2. Imperfect monitoring in extensive-form stage games. In extensive-form stage
games, making the assumption, as we do, that player one’s stage-game actions are perfectly
monitored is restrictive. This is because the assumption requires that player one’s whole















Figure 8: Experimenting with whether to play a coordination game.
Consider the example depicted in ﬁgure 8. In this game player two can choose whether to
experiment or not. If she chooses not to experiment, then she guarantees a payoﬀ equal to
zero. If she chooses to experiment, then a simultaneous-move coordination game is played.
The proﬁle (R,R) is a NE of the stage game, which is better than not experimenting; and
(S,S) is the other NE, which is worse than not experimenting. In this example, player one
has two information sets: one after player two plays D and another after player two plays
R or S. In this game our monitoring structure requires that player two see what player one
would have chosen after R or S even when she actually chooses D.
However, a reputation result also holds under the following monitoring structure: First,
only player one’s moves are observed, i.e., if player two observes whether player one plays
R or S only if signal r or s is realized. Second, regardless of what player two chooses as an
action, she nevertheless ends up playing each of her three moves with probability greater
than π ∈ (0,1/1/4). Finally, when player one makes his move, he does not observe player
33two’s intended action but only the resulting choice of move, i.e, the signal. We depict this
situation by adding a move by nature in ﬁgure 9. The essence of what we need for our
reputation result is captured well by this example: we need player two to tremble and play
each of her moves with positive probability, and we need this probability of a tremble to






























Figure 9: The stage game with nature’s moves. After any move that player two makes, a
similar continuation game is played where the probability with which nature mixes over
{r,s,d} is determined by player two’s move. (We’ve suppressed the continuation game after
S for brevity.) Speciﬁcally, nature mixes with the following probabilities: π(r|R) = π(s|S) =
π(d|D) = 1 − 2π and π(r|not R) = π(s|not S) = π(d|not D) = π.
5.3. Games outside of the class G. A stage game falls outside of the class G if the
payoﬀ proﬁle in which player one receives his highest IR payoﬀ is equal to his pure minimax
payoﬀ but the game does not have SCI. A prominent example of a game that falls outside
of the class G is the product-choice game depicted in ﬁgure 10. In this game player one’s
highest IR payoﬀ is equal to 1.5, player two receives her minimax payoﬀ (zero) in the unique
payoﬀ proﬁle in which player one gets 1.5, and the game has no gap. However, there is no
action, whether pure or mixed, such that committing to it would guarantee player one a
payoﬀ equal to 1.5 in this game.33 We discuss the repeated product-choice game to illustrate
what can go wrong in games outside of the class G.
This game is not an SA game; hence, Theorem 3 implies that we cannot obtain a reputation
result with pure-strategy ﬁnite automata. In addition, an argument similar to Lemma 1
implies that any ﬁnite automata, including one that plays a mixed strategy, has a positive
33 Player one gets 1.5 if he plays H and L with equal probability and if player two best responds by
playing B. However, both B and N are best responses for player two, and if she best responds by playing
N instead of B, then player one’s payoﬀ is equal to zero. Therefore, player one cannot guarantee 1.5 by




Figure 10: A product choice game.
shortfall. However, consider the type ω that plays H with probability 1/2+(1/2)2 in periods
{1,...,4}, plays H with probability 1/2 + (1/2)3 in periods {5,...,8}, and more generally
plays H with probability 1/2 + (1/2)k in periods {2(k−1) + 1,...,2k}. Player two’s unique
best response to ω is to play B in each period. Moreover, the commitment payoﬀ of this
type UC
1 (ω) is equal to 1.5 (player one’s highest IR payoﬀ). Consequently, ω is an inﬁnite
automaton with no shortfall.
Suppose that ω is the only commitment type available for player one to mimic. Even
though ω has no shortfall, our reputation result does not apply here. This is because the
type ω uses a mixed strategy. And, as we explained in the introduction, our approach is
unable to provide a reputation bound for types that play mixed strategies.
Now, for the sake of argument, suppose that player one’s stage-game action is to choose
the probability p ∈ [0,1] with which he plays H, and that player two observes his choice of
p at the end of each period. Given this modiﬁcation, ω plays a pure strategy.34 Even under
this modiﬁcation, however, our reputation result still does not apply. This is because the cost
to player two of playing action N instead of best responding to ω by playing B converges
to zero as player two becomes increasingly patient. Consequently, a patient player two can
resist playing a best response to ω at no cost to herself, and can thereby make it suﬃciently
diﬃcult for player one to build a reputation.
Without this modiﬁcation, one can also imagine a pure-strategy dynamic type that plays
H in portion p of periods of a block of periods, plays L in the remaining periods of the
block, and minimaxes player two for an appropriate number of periods if she fails to play
B in many periods in the block. The length of the blocks and the length of the punishment
periods can be carefully chosen to ensure that this dynamic type has a commitment payoﬀ
equal to 1.5. However, a patient player two can again resist best responding to this type at
no cost to herself. Whether a reputation result can be established for this game is an open
question.
34 A mixed strategy is then a probability distribution over choices of p ∈ [0,1], i.e., a mixed strategy is
an element of ∆([0,1]).
35A. Finite automata, learning, and Lemma 1
In this part of the appendix, in addition to Lemma 1, we prove some auxiliary results
concerning ﬁnite automata which we repeatedly use in our subsequent arguments. Also, we
prove our main learning result which we state as Lemma A.2. Our main learning result and
its corollary, that we state as Corollary A.1, play central roles in the proofs of Lemma 2 and
Theorem 1 presented in Appendix B.
Fix a pure strategy ﬁnite automata ω∗ ∈ Ω and a ﬁnite subset W ⊂ Σ1. Consider a new
ﬁnite set of states Θ, which is the product of the set of states of W and ω∗ with typical
element   θ = (θω∗,θ1,...,θ|W|). In the following development, we ﬁx player one’s strategy ω∗,
but the strategy of player 2, σ2 varies. Notice that a period t public history ht uniquely
identiﬁes the state   θt that the types are in at the start of period t. Let a∗(  θ) denote the pure
stage game action ω∗ plays in state θω∗. Every strategy proﬁle (ω∗,σ2) generates a stochastic












≡   τ(y,  θ
t).
Let Pr(  θt+n|  θt,ht,σ2) denote the probability that the state in period t+n is equal to   θt+n ∈ Θ
given that the state in period t is equal to   θt, the game is at history ht and player two is











In other words, Pr(  θt+1|  θt,ht,σ2) is the transition probability that governs the evolution
of the states.
Definition A.1 (Recurrence and Transience) A state   θ∗ is transient if, given that the
initial state is   θ∗, there is a non-zero probability (in Pr(ω∗,σ2)) that the state   θ∗ is never visited
again. A state is recurrent if it is not transient. A subset of states Θj ⊂ Θ is a recurrent
class if for each   θ′,  θ′′ ∈ Θj there exists an n > 0 such that Pr(  θt+n =   θ′|  θt =   θ′′,ht,σ2) > 0
for all ht, and for each   θ′′ ∈ Θj and   θ′ / ∈ Θj we have Pr(  θt+n =   θ′|  θt =   θ′′,ht,σ2) = 0 for
all ht and all n > 0. A subset of states Θ0 ⊂ Θ is a transitory class if each   θ ∈ Θ0 is a
transient state. A ﬁnite automaton is irreducible if its states form a single recurrent class.
Lemma A.1 Assume that Γ satisﬁes FS. For any   θ′ ∈ Θj and n > 0 we have Pr(  θt+n =
  θ′|  θt =   θ(ht),ht,σ2) > 0 for some σ2 and ht if and only if Pr(  θk+n =   θ′|  θk =   θ(ˆ hk),ˆ hk,σ′
2) > 0
for all k ≥ 0, σ′
2, and all ˆ hk such that   θ(ˆ hk) =   θ(ht). Consequently, the ﬁnite set of possible
36states Θ can be uniquely partitioned into a transitory class Θ0, and a collection of disjoint
recurrent classes Θj such that Θ = ∪M
i=0Θi; and this partition is independently of σ2.
Proof: FS implies that the probability to transition from   θt+1 to   θt after history ht is













y∈{y:  τ(y,  θt)=  θt+1} π = |{y :   τ(y,  θ
t) =   θ
t+1}|π
So FS implies that Pr(  θt+1|  θt,ht,σ2) > 0 if and only if |{y :   τ(y,  θt) =   θt+1}| ≥ 1. But if
|{y :   τ(y,  θt) =   θt+1}| ≥ 1 then Pr(  θk+1|  θt(ˆ hk),ˆ hk,σ′
2) ≥ |{y :   τ(y,  θt) =   θt+1}|π ≥ π > 0
for any ˆ hk such that   θ(ˆ hk) =   θk. Iterating this argument generalizes the above to the case
of n > 1. Also, see Billingsley (1995), Chapter 1, Section 8, or Stokey et al. (1989), Chapter
11.1 for more on partitioning the set of states. ￿
Definition A.2 (Speed of learning between ω∗ and W) Let
¯ p(ω
∗,W) := max  θ∈{p(ω∗,ω,  θt) =1,ω∈W} p(ω,  θ),
where p(ω∗,ω,  θt) := o(ω,a∗(  θt),θt
ω). That is, p(ω∗,ω,  θt) is the probability that type ω plays
the same action as ω∗ in state   θt (a∗(  θt)) and ¯ p(ω∗,W) is the maximum of p(ω∗,ω,  θ) over the
set of types W and the set of states where p(ω,ω∗,  θ) diﬀers from 1. Notice that ¯ p(ω∗,W) <
1.35
Deﬁne the likelihood ratio recursively as Lω
t (h) = p(ω,  θt(h))Lω
t−1(h) and let Lω
0(h) =
Lω
0 =  (ω)/ (ω∗). Hence, Lω
t (h) =  (ω|ht)/ (ω∗|ht) and (Lω
t ,ht) is a supermartingale under
Pr(ω∗,σ2) (Fudenberg and Levine (1992) Lemma 4.1). Also, let LW
0 =  (W)/ (ω∗).
Lemma A.2 Assume that Γ satisﬁes FS and ¯ p(ω∗,W) ≤ ξ ∈ [0,1). For any ǫ > 0 and










> 1 − ǫ,
for any t > T(|Θ|,|W|,ξ,ǫ,φ), any   such that  (ω∗) > 0, and any strategy σ2 of player two.
35The maximum is well deﬁned since W is a ﬁnite set and {  θ : p(ω,  θ)  = 1,ω ∈ W}  = ∅ because for each
ω ∈ W ⊂ Ω−ω∗ there is a state such that p(ω,  θ)  = 1
37Proof: For any nonnegative integer k and even number l let E(l,k) denote the set
of inﬁnite histories such that for any h ∈ E(l,k) the process has entered a recurrent
class Θi(h) ⊂ Θ by period l/2 and all states   θ ∈ Θi(h) have been visited at least k
times by period l. For each nonnegative integer k and ǫ > 0 there exists l(k,|Θ|,ǫ) such
that Pr(ω∗,σ2){E(l(k,|Θ|,ǫ),k)} > 1 − ǫ for any σ2. This is because FS implies that the
probability the process enters a recurrent class after |Θ| periods is at least π|Θ|. FS also
implies that for any two states   θ′ and   θ′′ in the same recurrent class Θj we have that
Pr(  θt+|Θj| =   θ′|  θt =   θ′′,ht,σ2) > π|Θj| ≥ π|Θ| for any ht and any σ2.
Let k∗ = K(|W|,ξ,φ) =
lnφ−ln|W|
lnξ . Pick l∗ such that Pr(σ1(ω∗),σ2){E(l∗,k∗)} > 1−ǫ for any
σ2. We show that choosing T(|Θ|,|W|,ξ,ǫ,φ) = l∗ achieves the claim of the lemma.
Suppose that h ∈ E(l∗,k∗). If ω ∈ W−ω∗(hl∗), then there exists a state   θω ∈ Θi(h) such that
p(ω,  θω) ≤ ¯ p(ω∗,W) < ξ < 1. Because state   θω has been visited more than k∗ times by time l∗,
and because Lω
t (h) is a supermartingale, we have Lω




for any t ≥ l∗. Our initial choice of k∗ implies that if t > l∗ and if ω ∈ W−ω∗(hl) = W−ω∗(ht),
then Lω
t (h) =  (ω|ht)/ (ω∗|ht) ≤ φLW
0 /|W|. Consequently, if h ∈ E(l∗,k∗) and if t > l∗,
then  (W−ω∗(ht)|ht)/ (ω∗|ht) ≤ φLW
0 . Moreover, Pr(ω∗,σ2){E(l∗,k∗)} > 1 − ǫ proving the
result. ￿
Corollary A.1 Assume that Γ satisﬁes FS. For any   such that  (ω∗) > 0 and χ > 0
there exists T(ω∗, ,χ) such that





t) < χ} > 1 − χ,
for any t ≥ T(ω∗, ,χ) and any strategy σ2 of player two.
Proof: Choose ﬁnite set W ⊂ Σ1 such that  (W) ≥ 1−χ/2. Set ξ = ¯ p(ω∗,W), φ = χ/2LW
0
and ǫ = χ. Notice that |Θ|, |W|, LW
0 , and ξ depend only on   (through the choice of the set
W) and on ω∗. Observe that  (Σ1 \ ω∗(ht)|ht)/ (ω∗|ht) ≤  (W \ ω∗(ht)|ht)/ (ω∗|ht) + χ/2
for any ht and apply Lemma A.2. ￿
Lemma A.3 (Blackwell Optimality) Suppose Γ satisﬁes FS and that ω = (Θ,θ0,o,τ) is an
irreducible pure strategy ﬁnite automaton. For any σ2 ∈ Σ2, let










i.e., ˆ Ui(ω,σ2) is player i’s long-run average payoﬀ. Let O2 = {σ2 : Θ → A2} denote the ﬁnite
set of pure stationary strategies for player two. Let F(ω,δ) = co{(U1(ω,σ2,δ),U2(ω,σ2,δ)) :
σ2 ∈ Σ2} and F(ω) = co{(ˆ U1(ω,σ2), ˆ U2(ω,σ2)) : σ2 ∈ Σ2}.
38(i). For any stationary strategy σ2 ∈ O2, limδ→1 Ui(ω,σ2,δ) = Ui(ω,σ2) = ˆ Ui(ω,σ2).
(ii). The set F(ω,δ) = co{(U1(ω,σ2,δ),U2(ω,σ2,δ)) : σ2 ∈ O2} and F(ω) = co{(U1(ω,σ2),U2(ω,σ2)) :
σ2 ∈ O2}, i.e, the ﬁnite set of vectors {(U1(ω,σ2),U2(ω,σ2)) : σ2 ∈ O2} are extreme
points of F(ω).
(iii). There exist a δ∗ ∈ (0,1) and a pure stationary strategy o2 ∈ O2 such that o2 ∈ BR(ω,δ)
and UC
1 (ω,δ) = U1(ω,o2,δ) for all δ ∈ (δ∗,1).
(iv). Moreover, for any stationary σ2, we have |U2(ω,σ2,δ|ht)−U2(ω,σ2,δ|hk)| ≤ K, |U2(ω,σ2,δ|ht)−
U2(ω,σ2|hk)| ≤ K, |UC
1 (ω,δ|ht)−UC
1 (ω,δ|hk)| ≤ K, and |UC
1 (ω,δ|ht)−UC
1 (ω|hk)| ≤ K,
for any ht,hk ∈ H(ω) and any stationary σ2 where K = (1 − δ|Θi|)M/(δπ)|Θi|.
Proof: Part (i) follows from Bertsekas (2007), chapter 4, Proposition 1.2. Part (ii) follows
from Dutta (1995), Lemma 1 because the sets F(ω,δ) and F(ω) are the set of feasible payoﬀs
for a discounted and undiscounted stochastic game, respectively, where the state space is Θ,
the unique action available to player one in state θ is o(θ) and the transition function is τ.
For part (iii), ﬁrst notice that against a ﬁxed ω ﬁnding player two’s best response is a
standard discounted dynamic programming problem. Thus, a standard argument shows that
a pure stationary best response exists (see Bertsekas (2007), Chapter 1). Also notice, if σ is
a stationary strategy proﬁle, then Ui(σ,δ|ht) = Ui(σ,δ|hk) for any ht,hk ∈ H(ω) such that
θ(ht) = θ(hk). Let U2(ω,δ|ht) denote player two’s payoﬀ after ht given that she best responds
to ω. Since a stationary best response exists U2(ω,δ|ht) = U2(ω,δ|hk) for any ht,hk ∈ H(ω)
such that θ(ht) = θ(hk). Player one’s commitment payoﬀ is given by the following dynamic
program: UC
1 (ω,δ|ht) = minα2∈∆(A2)(1 − δ)g1(ω,α2) + δEy[UC
1 (ω,δ|ht,ω,y)|α2] subject to
(1 − δ)g2(ω,α2) + δE[U2(ω,δ|θ′)|θ,α2] = U2(ω,δ|θ), where U2(ω,δ|θ) is player two’s payoﬀ
in state θ given that she best responds. A standard argument shows that a pure stationary
solution to this dynamic program exists. The existence of δ∗ and o2 follows from the existence
of a Blackwell optimal policy in ﬁnite state and ﬁnite action dynamic programs. See Bertsekas
(2007), Chapter 4, Proposition 2.2.
Part (iv). Lemma A.1 implies that Pr(θ(hk+|Θ|)|θ(hk),σ2(hk)) ≥ π|Θ| for any θ(ht), θ(hk) ∈
Θ. Let history hk be such that Ui(ω,σ2,δ|hk) = max{hl:θ(hl)∈Θ} Ui(ω,σ2,δ|hl) and let history
ht be such that Ui(ω,σ2,δ|ht) = min{hl:θ(hl)∈Θ} Ui(ω,σ2,δ|hl). We have the following two
equations
Ui(ω,σ2,δ|h

















Solving delivers the result. The argument for |UC
1 (ω,δ|ht)−UC
1 (ω,δ|hk)| is identical because
there is a stationary strategy for player two that delivers player one his commitment payoﬀ.
39Also, see Bertsekas (2007), Chapter 4, Proposition 1.2 for the remainder of the inequalities.
￿
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof: If part is straightforward since the type that plays as
1 every period is a one state
pure strategy ﬁnite automaton with no shortfall. We now turn to the only if part: Lemma
A.3 implies that there is a δ∗ < 1, and a pure stationary strategy o2 : Θ → A2 which is
a best response to σ1 for any δ > δ∗. Suppose that SA is not satisﬁed but there exists a
pure strategy ﬁnite automata repeated game strategy σ1 such that UC
1 (σ1|ht) = ¯ g1 for some
ht ∈ H(σ1). Since the automaton is ﬁnite, there should be a recurrent class of the states of
the automaton Θj such that UC
1 (σ1|ht) = ¯ g1 for any ht such that θ(ht) ∈ Θj.
We will ﬁrst show that g1(o(θ),o2(θ)) = ¯ g1 and g2(o(θ),o2(θ)) = gb
2 for any state θ ∈ Θj.
Case 1: gb
2 > ˆ g2. In this case ¯ g1 = max{g1 : (g1,g2) ∈ F}. Combining this with the fact
that UC
1 (σ1|ht) = ¯ g1 for any ht with θ(ht) ∈ Θj and FS assumption we get g1(o(θ),o2(θ)) = ¯ g1




2 = ˆ g2. UC
1 (σ1|ht) = ¯ g1 for any ht with θ(ht) ∈ Θj implies that limδ→1 U2(σ1,σ2,δ|ht) =
ˆ g2. Player two can guarantee herself ˆ g2 in each recurrent state. Suppose that g2(o(θ1),o2(θ1)) <
ˆ g2 for some state θ1 ∈ Θj. Then there must exist another state θ2 ∈ Θj such that g2(o(θ2),o2(θ2)) >
ˆ g2, because otherwise player two’s payoﬀ after a history ht with θ(ht) = θ1, U2(σ1,σ2,δ|ht),
would be below her minimax which would contradict that σ2 is a best response to σ1
. However, then an alternative strategy σ′
2 for player two that gets at least ˆ g2 in any
state other than θ2 and gets g2(o(θ2),o2(θ2)) > ˆ g2 at state θ2 would have the feature that
limδ→1 U2(σ1,σ2,δ|ht) > ˆ g2 from the FS assumption, hence contradicting that σ2 is a best re-
sponse to σ1. Consequently, there is no recurrent state θ ∈ Θj for which g2(o(θ),o2(θ)) < ˆ g2.
If for every θ ∈ Θj we have g2(o(θ),o2(θ)) ≥ ˆ g2 and if we have UC
1 (σ1|ht) = ¯ g1 then
g1(o(θ),o2(θ)) = ¯ g1 for any θ ∈ Θj. If gb
2 = ˆ g2, then g2(o(θ),o2(θ)) ≥ ˆ g2 for any state
θ ∈ Θj. However, no gap together with g1(o(θ),o2(θ)) = ¯ g1 and g2(o(θ),o2(θ)) ≥ ˆ g2 for any
state θ ∈ Θj implies that g2(o(θ),o2(θ)) = gb
2.
We now complete the argument. If assumption SA does not hold then for any a1 ∈ A1,
there exists a2 ∈ A2 which is a best response to a1 and g1(a1,a2) < ¯ g1. Consequently, for any
θ ∈ Θj, there is a a2(θ) ∈ A2 such that a2(θ) is a best response to o(θ) and g1(o(θ),a2(θ)) < ¯ g1.
Since a2(θ) is a best response to o(θ) it must be that g2(o(θ),a2(θ)) ≥ g2(o(θ),o2(θ)) = gb
2 for
each θ ∈ Θj. Consequently, the repeated game strategy for player two obtained by replacing
o2(θ) by a2(θ) gives player two a weakly higher repeated game payoﬀ. However, this new
strategy gives player one a payoﬀ that is strictly lower than ¯ g1 for any θ ∈ Θj, which is a
40contradiction. ￿
B. Proof of Lemma 2 and Theorem 1
B.1. Preliminaries. Fix a stage game Γ that satisﬁes FS and that has no gap. Normalize
payoﬀs such that (¯ g1,gb
2) = (0,0). For this game, there exists a ﬁnite constant ρ ≥ 0 such
that the following inequalities holds:
g2 ≤ −ρg1, for any (g1,g2) ∈ F; and g2 ≥ ρg1, for any (g1,g2) ∈ G. (6)
In addition, if ˆ g2 < 0, then the following inequality also holds:
(7) g2 ≥ ρg1, for any (g1,g2) ∈ F.
Fix a pure strategy ﬁnite automata ω∗ = (Θ∗,θ∗,o∗,τ∗). Let ω∗
θ = (Θ∗,θ,o∗,τ∗), that is,
ω∗
θ is a pure strategy ﬁnite automaton which is identical to ω∗ except that it may have a
diﬀerent initial state θ ∈ Θ∗. Recall that the set of commitment types is a countable subset of
the set of repeated game strategies of player one Σ1. For any z ∈ (0,1] and φ ≥ 0, let ∆ω∗,φ,z
denote the set of all measures   over {N} ∪Σ1 with countable support such that  (ω∗) ≥ z
and  (Σ1 \ {ω∗})/ (ω∗) ≤ φ, let ∆ω∗,z denote the set of all measures   over {N} ∪ Σ1 with
countable support such that  (ω∗) ≥ z, and let ∆ω∗ denote the set of all measures   over
{N} ∪ Σ1 with countable support such that  (ω∗) > 0.




θ,σ2,δ) : θ ∈ Θ
∗,   ∈ ∆ω∗
θ,φ,z, σ2 is part of a NE of Γ
∞(δ, )}.
In words, U(δ,φ,z) is player one’s worst payoﬀ if he plays strategy ω∗
θ for some θ, if player
two plays an equilibrium strategy, if the probability of ω∗
θ is at least z, and if the relative
likelihood of the other commitment types is at most φ.
B.2. The reputation bound. We ﬁrst prove Lemma B.1 given below in this section. We
then prove Lemma 2 using Lemma B.1 and Corollary A.1.
Lemma B.1 Fix any δ ∈ [0,1), z ∈ (0,1], φ ≥ 0. Let b ≥ 0 be a constant such that
UC
1 (ω∗
θ,δ) > −b for all θ ∈ Θ∗. Deﬁne ǫ := max{b,(1−δ|Θ∗|)/(δπ)|Θ∗|,φ}. Assume that there
exists constants l(ω∗) > 0 and K1(ω∗) > 0 such that if U1(ω∗
θ,σ2,δ) ≤ −b−x for any x > 0,
41then U2(ω∗
θ,σ2,δ) ≤ −l(ω∗)x + K1(ω∗)ǫ. If z ≥ z, then we have the following inequality:
U(δ,φ,z) ≥ −b − f(l(ω
∗),z)ǫ, where (8)
f(l(ω








∗) + K1 + ρ(5 + 8M)}, (10)
¯ n(z,l(ω







We now proceed with the proof of Lemma B.1. As we will keep φ ﬁxed for the rest of the
development, we will drop reference to φ from the function U(δ,φ,z). The following lemma
bounds player one’s payoﬀ in histories where he deviates from the strategy ω∗ with positive
probability.
Lemma B.2 (Player one’s incentive constraint) Pick any z > 0,   ∈ ∆ω∗,φ,z, σ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ,δ))
and public history ht such that ht ∈ H(ω∗) and ht ∈ H(σ1(N)). Let a∗
1 = ω∗(ht), α2 = σ2(ht).
Suppose that  (ω∗|ht,a∗
1,y) ≥ z for all y ∈ Y . Suppose player one plays a1  = a∗
1 with positive
probability in period t, then U1(σ,δ|ht,a1,α2) ≥ U(δ,z) − 2Mǫ.
Proof: Notice a1 ∈ supp(σ1(N,ht)) implies that player one’s repeated game payoﬀ from
playing a1 must be at least as large as his repeated game payoﬀ from playing strategy ω∗
from period t onwards. Consequently,
(1 − δ)g1(a1,α2) + δU1(σ,δ|h







Let θy denote ω∗’s state after history (ht,a∗
1,y). Recall ω|(ht,a∗
1,y) is the continuation strategy
induced by history (ht,a∗
1,y). For each y ∈ Y , deﬁne measure  y ∈ ∆ωθy as  y(ω|(ht,a∗
1,y)) =
 (ω|ht,a∗
1,y) for each ω ∈ Σ1 and  y(N) =  (N|ht,a∗
1,y). Notice,  y(ω∗
θy) ≥ z and  y(Σ1 \
ω∗
θy)/ y(ω∗
θy) ≤ φ for each y ∈ Y . Because (ht,a∗
1,y) ∈ H(ω∗) for any y ∈ Y , Remark 1 implies
that σ2|(ht,a∗
1,y) is part of a NE proﬁle of Γ∞(δ, y) for any y ∈ Y . Therefore, Deﬁnition B.1
implies that U1(ω∗,σ2,δ|ht,a∗
1,α2) ≥ U(δ,z). Observing that g1(a∗
1,α2) − g1(a1,α2) ≥ −2M
and rearranging we get
U1(σ,δ|h
t,a1,α2) ≥ −2M(1 − δ)/δ + U1(σ,δ|h
t,a
∗
1,α2) ≥ −2M(1 − δ)/δ + U(δ,z).
￿
Corollary B.1 Suppose that ˆ g2 < 0. Pick any z > 0,   ∈ ∆ω∗,φ,z, σ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ,δ)) and
public history ht such that ht ∈ H(ω∗) and ht ∈ H(σ1(N)). Let a∗
1 = ω∗(ht) and suppose that
42 (ω∗|ht,a∗
1,y) ≥ z for each y ∈ Y . Suppose player one plays a1  = a∗
1 with positive probability





(U(δ,z) − 2Mǫ), for all y ∈ Y.
Proof: Let α2 = σ2(ht). Notice FS implies that the probability of any signal y ∈ Y
is at least π under α2. Also, player one’s highest feasible payoﬀ is equal to zero because
ˆ g2 < 0. By deﬁnition, U(δ,z)−2M(1−δ)/δ ≤ 0. However, the fact that player one’s highest
payoﬀ is equal to zero, U(δ,z) − 2M(1 − δ)/δ ≤ 0, and FS together imply that player one’s
continuation payoﬀ after any y, U1(σ,δ|ht,a1,y), must be at least
1
π(U(δ,z)−2M(1−δ)/δ).
Because otherwise the expectation under α2 cannot achieve the lower bound given in Lemma
B.2. ￿
The following lemma converts the bound on player one’s continuation payoﬀ into a bound
on player two’s continuation payoﬀ using inequalities (6) and (7).
Lemma B.3 (Payoﬀ conversion) Pick any   ∈ ∆ω∗,φ,z, σ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ,δ)) and history ht
such that ht ∈ H(ω) and ht ∈ H(σ1(N)). Let a∗
1 = ω∗(ht), α2 = σ2(ht) and suppose that
 (ω∗|ht,a∗
1,y) ≥ z for each y ∈ Y . Suppose player one plays a1  = a∗
1 with positive probability
in period t, then
U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|h
t,a1,α2) ≤ −ρ(U(δ,z) − 2Mǫ).





(U(δ,z) − 2Mǫ), for any y ∈ Y.
Proof: By deﬁnition we have (U1(σ,δ|ht,a1,α2),U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|ht,a1,α2)) ∈ F and U1(σ,δ|ht,a1,α2) ≥
U(δ,z) − 2M(1 − δ)/δ, by Lemma B.2. Consequently, inequality (6) implies that
U2(σ1(N),σ2,δ|h
t,a1,α2) ≤ ρ(−U(δ,z) + 2M(1 − δ)/δ).





(U(δ,z) − 2M(1 − δ)/δ), for any y ∈ Y.
￿
We will now establish upper bound (Lemma B.6) and a lower bound (Lemma B.7) on
43player two’s equilibrium payoﬀs. However, ﬁrst we deﬁne and elaborate on some stopping
times and events which we will utilize in establishing the upper and lower bounds.
Definition B.2 (Stopping time and events) Fix a strategy proﬁle σ, a measure   ∈ ∆ω∗
θ
and a constant z′ ∈ (0,1].
(i). Stopping time τ1: For any inﬁnite history h, let τ1(h) be the ﬁrst period t such that
ht contains a deviation from ω∗
θ and if such a period t does not exist, then τ1(h) = ∞.
In words, if τ1(h) = t, then player one’s action is identical to a∗(hk) in all periods
k < t−1, and player one’s action in period t−1 is diﬀerent from a∗(ht−1). The event
{h : τ1(h) ≤ t} is ht-measurable for any t thus τ1 is a stopping time.
(ii). Stopping time τ2: For any inﬁnite history h, let τ2(σ, ,z′,h) be the ﬁrst period t such
that  (ω∗
θ|ht) < z′ and  (ω∗
θ|ht,a∗(ht),y) ≥ z′ for any y ∈ Y . If such a period t does
not exist, then τ2(σ, ,z′,h) = ∞. The event {h : τ2(σ, ,z′,h) ≤ t} is ht-measurable
for any t thus τ2 is a stopping time.
(iii). Event E1: Let E1(σ, ,z′) = {h : τ1(h) < τ2(σ, ,z′,h)}.
(iv). Event E2: Let E2(σ, ,z′) = {h : τ1(h) ≥ τ2(σ, ,z′,h)} If both τ1(h) = ∞ and
τ2(σ, ,z′,h) = ∞, then we say that τ1(h) ≥ τ2(σ, ,z′,h).
Notice that the two events E1 and E2 are complements of each other. The following two
lemmas are intermediary results that expand on the properties of the above deﬁned stopping
times and events. We use these intermediary results in establishing the upper and lower
bound on player two’s equilibrium payoﬀs.
Lemma B.4 For any z,z′ ∈ (0,1],   ∈ ∆ω∗
θ,z, and any strategy proﬁle σ, Prσ, [E1(σ, ,z′)] ≤
max{1 − z/z′,0} where Prσ,  denotes player two’s belief over the set of all histories if the
players use strategy proﬁle σ and if player two’s prior over player one’s types is  .
Proof: Player one’s reputation level in period t,  (ω∗
θ|ht), is a uniformly bounded mar-
tingale under Prσ, . For any ﬁnite constant T, the random variable τ = τ1 ∧ τ2 ∧ T is a
stopping time because τ1 and τ2 are stopping times. Also, Prσ, {τ < ∞} = 1. Consequently,
the optional stopping theorem implies that E[ (ω∗
θ|hτ)] = E[ (ω∗
θ|h0)] =  (ω∗




τ)] = Prσ, {τ1 < τ2∧T}E[ (ω
∗
θ|h




Notice that E[ (ω∗




τ)] = Prσ, {τ1 ≥ τ2 ∧ T}E[ (ω
∗
θ|h
τ)|τ1 ≥ τ2 ∧ T].
44However, E[ (ω∗
θ|hτ)|τ1 ≥ τ2 ∧ T] ≤ z′ and hence z ≤ E[ (ω∗
θ|hτ)] ≤ z′ Prσ, {τ1 ≥ τ2 ∧ T}.
Thus, the monotone convergence theorem implies that z ≤ z′ limT→∞ Prσ, {τ1 ≥ τ2 ∧ T} =
z′ Prσ, {τ1 ≥ τ2}. Hence, z/z′ ≤ Prσ, {τ1 ≥ τ2} and therefore Prσ, {τ1 < τ2} ≤ 1 − z/z′. ￿
Lemma B.5 (Player two’s payoﬀ until player one deviates from ω∗
θ.) Suppose that σb
2 is a
best response to ω∗
θ, then,
 











    ≤ ǫ(2ρ + M), for any σ1,

















≤ ǫ(2ρ + M) for any σ1 and σ2.
Proof: Note that Pσ1,σ2(h = (ht,h−t)|t < τ1) = Pωθ,σ2(h = (ht,h−t)|t < τ1), for any























We deﬁne ht measurable the random variable xt as follows:












































































Consequently, xt = Eω∗
θ,σb
2[xt+1|ht]. Therefore, for every t ≥ 0, Eω∗
θ,σb
2 [xt+1 − xt|ht] = 0.
Hence, xt is a martingale with respect to Pω∗
θ,σb
2. For any integer n ≥ 1, let τ(n) := τ1 ∧ n.




































































  ≤ 2ρǫ.
Since this is true for any n ≥ 1, and since the payoﬀs are bounded and are discounted, by































  ≤ 2ρǫ + (1 − δ)M.
Let σ2 be any strategy of player 2. Now xt is a supermartingale because the continuation
payoﬀs from strategy proﬁle (ω∗
θ,σ2) can be at most U2(ω∗
θ,σb
2,δ|ht) at any history ht ∈
H(ω∗




























































≤ ρ2ǫ + (1 − δ)M.
￿
Below we use Lemma B.3, Deﬁnition B.2, Lemma B.4, and Lemma B.5 to calculate the up-
per and lower bound for player two’s payoﬀs. For z,z′ ∈ (0,1], deﬁne q(z,z′) := max{z/z′,0}.
Lemma B.6 (Upper-bound) Suppose z,z′ ∈ (0,1]. Let ξ > 0, θ ∈ Θ∗,   ∈ ∆ω∗
θ,φ,z, and
σ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ,δ)) be such that U1(ω∗
θ,σ2,δ) ≤ U(δ,z) + ξ. For the chosen NE σ,
U2(σ,δ, ) ≤ −ρq(z,z
′)U(z,δ)) − ρU(z
′,δ) + lz(U(δ,z) + ξ) + Kǫ, (13)
where K = 2ρ + 2M + 4Mρ + l + K1.
Proof: Suppose that τ1(h) is inﬁnite, i.e., player one never deviates from ωθ. In this case,
U2(σ,δ, |τ1 = ∞) = U2(ω∗
θ,σ2,δ, ) ≤ (U(δ,z) + ξ + b)l + K1ǫ ≤ (U(δ,z) + ξ)l + ǫl + K1ǫ,
by the maintained assumption of Lemma B.1.
Suppose that τ1(h) is ﬁnite. An upper bound on player two’s total payoﬀ for the periods
zero through τ1(h) − 1 is given by Lemma B.5 and is at most ǫ(2ρ + M). We will bound
player two’s continuation payoﬀ after hτ1(h) in the events player one is the normal type and
E1(σ, ,z′) occurs, the event that player one is the normal type and the event E2(σ, ,z′)
occurs, and the event that player one is any other type.
If h ∈ E1(σ, ,z′), then  ( |hτ1(h)−1,a∗
1(hτ1(h)−1),y) ∈ ∆ω∗
θ,φ,z for any y ∈ Y . Consequently,





τ1(h)−1)) ≤ ρ(−U(z,δ) + 2Mǫ),
by Lemma B.3. If h ∈ E2(σ, ,z′), then  ( |hτ1(h)−1,a∗
1(hτ1(h)−1),y) ∈ ∆ω∗
θ,φ,z′ for any y ∈ Y .
Consequently, player two’s expected continuation payoﬀ is at most ρ(−U(z′,δ) + 2Mǫ) by
Lemma B.3. The probability of event E1(σ, ,z′) is at most q(z,z′), by Lemma B.4, the
probability of event E2(σ, ,z′) is at most one, the probability of ω  = ω∗
θ is at most φ ≤ ǫ.
So,
U2(σ,δ, |τ1 < ∞) ≤ ǫ(2ρ + M) + ρ(−q(z,z
′)U(z,δ) − U(z
′,δ) + 4Mǫ) + φM.
However, as we argued before, U2(σ,δ|τ1 = ∞) ≤ lǫ+K1ǫ+(U(δ,z)+ξ)l, and the probability
that τ1 = ∞ is at least z > 0 because   ∈ ∆ω∗
θ,φ,z. Consequently,
U2(σ,δ, ) ≤ ǫ(2ρ+2M +4Mρ+l+K1)+ρ(−q(z,z
′)U(z,δ))−U(z
′,δ))+(U(δ,z)+ξ)lz,
47because U ≤ 0, because φ ≤ ǫ, and because ρ, ǫ, l, and M are positive constants. Thus,
U2(σ,δ, ) ≤ −ρq(z,z
′)U(z,δ)) − ρU(z
′,δ) + lz(U(δ,z) + ξ) + Kǫ,
where K = 2ρ + 2M + 4Mρ + l + K1. ￿
Lemma B.7 (Lower-bound) Suppose z,z′ ∈ (0,1]. For any θ ∈ Θ∗,   ∈ ∆ω∗
θ,φ,z and any
σ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ,δ)),









where K = ρ(3 +
4M
π ) + 2M.
Proof: Notice that ˆ g2 ≤ 0. This is because gb
2 = 0. If ˆ g2 = 0, then inequality (14) trivially
holds because the righthand side is nonpositive.
Assume ˆ g2 < 0. Pick any σ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ,δ)), pick σb




2(hk), if period k public history hk ∈ H(ω∗
θ); and σ∗
2(hk) = σ2(hk),
otherwise. Let strategy proﬁle σ∗ = (σ1,σ∗
2).
Suppose that τ1(h) is inﬁnite, i.e., player one never deviates from ω∗
θ. In this case, U2(σ,δ, |τ1 =
∞) = U2(ω∗
θ,σ∗
2,δ, ) ≥ −bρ, by the maintained assumption of Lemma B.1.
Suppose that τ1(h) is ﬁnite. A lower bound on player two’s total payoﬀ for the periods
zero through τ1(h) − 1 is given by Lemma B.5 and is at least −ǫ(2ρ + M). We will bound
player two’s continuation payoﬀ after hτ1(h) in the events player one is the normal type and
E1(σ∗, ,z′) occurs, the event that player one is the normal type and the event E2(σ∗, ,z′)
occurs, and the event that player one is any other type.
If h ∈ E1(σ∗, ,z′), then  ( |hτ1(h)−1,a∗
1(hτ1(h)−1),y) ∈ ∆ω∗
θ,φ,z for any y ∈ Y . Consequently,
player two’s continuation payoﬀ after history hτ1(h) is at least
ρ
π(U(z,δ)−2Mǫ) by Lemma B.3.
If h ∈ E2(σ∗, ,z′), then  ( |hτ1(h)−1,a∗
1(hτ1(h)−1),y) ∈ ∆ω∗
θ,φ,z′ for any y ∈ Y . Consequently,
player two’s continuation payoﬀ after history hτ1(h) is at least
ρ
π(U(z′,δ) − 2Mǫ) by Lemma
B.3. The probability of event E1(σ∗, ,z′) is at most q(z,z′), by Lemma B.4, the probability
of event E2(σ∗, ,z′) is at most one, the probability of ω  = ω∗
θ is at most φ. Also, the
probability that τ1(h) is inﬁnite is at most one. So,
U2(σ

















where K = ρ(3 + 4M
π ) + 2M. ￿
Lemma B.8 Fix z ∈ (0,1],   ∈ ∆ω∗,z,φ. Let ¯ q = πlz/4ρ. For any z,z′ ∈ [z,1] such that
q(z,z′) ≤ ¯ q the following inequality holds:
(15) U(z,δ) ≥ KU(z
′,δ) − Kǫ.
where K = 1
2zlπ max{8ρ,4M + l + K1 + ρ(5 + 8M)}.
Proof: The deﬁnition of U(δ,z) implies that U(δ,z) = 0 or U(δ,z) = v(δ,z). If U(δ,z) = 0,
then the inequality is obviously true. If U(δ,z) = v(δ,z), then for each ξ > 0, there is θ ∈ Θ∗,
 ξ ∈ ∆ω∗
θ,φ,z, and σξ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ξ,δ)) such that U1(ω∗
θ,σ
ξ
2,σ) ≤ U(δ,z) + ξ. Lemma B.6
implies that U2(σξ,δ, ξ) satisﬁes inequality (13). Also, Lemma B.7 implies that U2(σξ,δ, ξ)
satisﬁes inequality (14). Combining the two inequalities gives



































Redeﬁning the constant K = 1
2zlπ max{8ρ,4M +l +K1 +ρ(5+8M)} delivers the result. ￿
Proof of Lemma B.1: If z′ = 1, then U(z′,δ) ≥ UC
1 (ω∗,δ) ≥ −b. Consequently, if z ≥ z,
z′ = 1, and z ∈ [(1 − ¯ q),1], then inequality (15) implies that U(z,δ) ≥ −(b + ǫ)K. (Recall
49that ¯ q = πlz/4ρ.)
We will show that if z ≥ z and if z ∈ [(1 − ¯ q)n,(1 − ¯ q)n−1], then U(z,δ)) ≥ −bKn−1 −
ǫ
 n−1
j=1 Kj by using induction on n. We make the inductive hypothesis that if z ≥ z and if
z ∈ [(1 − ¯ q)k−1,(1 − ¯ q)k−2], then we have U(z,δ) ≥ −bKk−1 − ǫ
 k−1
j=1 Kj.
If z ≥ z, z′ = (1 − ¯ q)k−1, and z ∈ [(1 − q)k,(1 − q)k−1], then inequality (15) and the















The deﬁnition of ¯ n implies that z ∈ [(1 − ¯ q)¯ n−1,(1 − ¯ q)¯ n−2], and consequently, U(z,δ) ≥
−bK¯ n−1−ǫ
 ¯ n−1
j=1 Kj. If K ≥ 2, then
 ¯ n−1
j=1 Kj ≤ K¯ n. Consequently, if z ≥ z, then U(z,δ) ≥
−b − ¯ K¯ n where ¯ K = 1
zlπ max{2l,8ρ,4M + l + K1 + ρ(5 + 8M)}. ￿
B.3. Proof of Lemma 2. We will ﬁrst show, in the following lemma, that any irreducible
ﬁnite automaton satisﬁes the hypothesis of Lemma B.1. Then we will then use Lemma B.1
and Corollary A.1 to establish Lemma 2.
Lemma B.9 (Unit cost lemma) If ω∗ is a irreducible ﬁnite automaton, then UC
1 (ω∗
θ,δ) ≥ −b
where b = d(ω∗) + M(1 − δ|Θ∗|)/(δπ)|Θ∗| for any θ ∈ Θ∗. Moreover, there exists a constant
l(ω∗) > 0 such that if U1(ω∗
θ,σ2,δ) ≤ −b−x for some θ ∈ Θ∗ and x > 0, then U2(ω∗
θ,σ2,δ) ≤
−lx + K1ǫ where K1 = ρ + lM + 1.
Proof: Lemma A.3, part (iv) implies that UC
1 (ω∗) = UC
1 (ω∗
θ) and consequently d(ω∗) =
d(ω∗
θ). Applying Lemma A.3, part (iv) once again shows that UC
1 (ω∗
θ,δ) ≥ −b for any θ ∈ Θ∗.
Pick mixed stationary strategy σ∗







θ,σ2,δ)). Such a strategy exists by Lemma A.3, part (i). Lemma A.3
part (iv) together with U1(ω∗
θ,σ∗
2,δ) ≤ −b − x implies that U1(ω∗
θ,σ∗
2) ≤ −b − x + Mǫ.











1 (ω∗) − y.
Lemma A.3, part (iv) implies that UC
1 (ω∗) = UC
1 (ω∗
θ). Hence, the deﬁnition of the commit-
ment payoﬀ, UC
1 (ω∗




2 is a best response to ω∗
θ. Consequently, a standard result from linear programming
implies that there exists l > 0 such that v(y) ≤ v(0)−ly for all y ≥ 0 (see for example Vohra
(2005), Theorem 4.5.1). Furthermore, v(0) = U2(ω∗
θ,σb
2) implies that v(y) ≤ v(0)− ly for all
y.
Substituting −x+Mǫ for y implies that U2(ω∗
θ,σ∗





2) ≤ bρ by inequality (6). Consequently, U2(ω∗
θ,σ∗
2) ≤ bρ − lx + lMǫ.
However, Lemma A.3 part (iv) implies that U2(ω∗
θ,σ∗
2,δ) ≤ bρ−lx+lMǫ+Mǫ and therefore
U2(ω∗
θ,σ2,δ) ≤ bρ − lx + lMǫ + Mǫ. Consequently, U2(ω∗
θ,σ2,δ) ≤ −lx + K1ǫ where K1 =
ρ + lM + 1. ￿
Notice that the bound in Lemma B.1 depends on both φ and δ. The learning result
in Corollary A.1 implies that the likelihood of other commitment types becomes arbitrarily
small if player one mimics type ω∗ for a suﬃciently long number of periods. To prove Lemma
2 we will use the learning result in Corollary A.1 and take the limit as δ goes to 1 to show
that the bound in Lemma B.1 can be written independent of φ at the limit.
Proof of Lemma 2: Fix   ∈ ∆ω∗ and let z =  (ω∗). Pick ξ > 0. Let φξ > 0 be such that
φξf(z,l(ω∗)) ≤ ξ/3 and φξM ≤ ξ/3. Let T ∗ = T(ω∗, ∗,φξ) be such that for any t ≥ T ∗ we
have






ξ} > 1 − φ
ξ,
for any strategy σ2. Such a T ∗ exists by Corollary A.1. Pick δξ such that (1−δT∗+1)M < ξ/3
for all δ ≥ δξ.
For any σ ∈ NE(Γ∞(δ, )) and any history hT∗ ∈ H(ω∗) such that  (Σ1\ω∗(hT∗)|hT∗)/ (ω∗|hT∗) <
φξ by Lemma B.1 we have
U1(ωθ,σ2,δ|h
T∗








where θ denotes ω∗’s state after history hT∗
∈ H(ω∗) and d(δ) = d(ω∗)+M(1−δ|Θ∗|)/(δπ)|Θ∗|.
The probability of  (Σ1 \ ω∗(hT∗)|hT∗)/ (ω∗|hT∗) < φξ is at least 1 − φξ under Pr(ω∗,σ2) for
any σ2. Consequently, for any σ ∈ NE(Γ∞(δ, )), we have
U1(ω










where ǫ(δ,ξ) = max{(1 − δ|Θ∗|)/(δπ)|Θ∗|,d(δ),φξ}. As (−d(δ) − f(z,l(ω∗))ǫ(δ,ξ)) ≤ 0 and
−(1 − δT∗+1)M ≤ 0 the following holds
U1(ω
∗,σ2,δ) ≥ −(1 − δ
T∗+1)M − d(δ) − f(z,l(ω
∗))ǫ(δ,ξ) − φ
ξM,
51for any σ ∈ NE(Γ∞(δ, )). As (1 − δT∗+1)M < ξ/3 and φξM ≤ ξ/3 we ﬁnd that
U1(ω





for any σ ∈ NE(Γ∞(δ, )) and any δ ≥ δξ. Also, because φξf(z,l(ω∗)) ≤ ξ/3 we ﬁnd that
U1(ω




for any σ ∈ NE(Γ∞(δ, )) and any δ ≥ δξ. However, because ω∗ is a feasible strategy for
player one U1(σ,δ) ≥ U1(ω∗,σ2,δ). Consequently,




for any σ ∈ NE(Γ∞(δ, )) and any δ ≥ δξ. Hence,
U
NE




for any δ ≥ δξ. Because ξ is arbitrary and because limδ→1 d(δ) = d(ω∗), we conclude that
UNE
1 ( ) ≥ −d(ω∗) − f(z,l(ω∗))d(ω∗). ￿
B.4. Proof of Theorem 1. For games that satisfy SA, the proof of Theorem 1 follows
immediately from Lemma 2 as described in the main text. In this section, we instead assume
that the stage game Γ is in G but does not satisfy SA, i.e., Γ has LNCI or SCI but does not
satisfy SA. However, because any game with SCI also satisﬁes SA by deﬁnition, our focus
here is on games with LNCI.
In order to prove Theorem 1, we construct the commitment type ω∗ which is an automaton
with an inﬁnite number of states with no shortfall. Recall that for a game with LNCI that
does not satisfy SA there is no ﬁnite automaton with no shortfall. In constructing the inﬁnite
automaton ω∗, ﬁrst we describe a ﬁnite automaton that we term a “review type” in the next
section, second we establish a reputation bound for this review type (Lemma B.12) which is
a strengthened version of Lemma B.1, third we construct type ω∗ using an inﬁnite sequence
of review types, and ﬁnally we prove the bound for ω∗ that is claimed in Theorem 1.
B.4.1. Review types. Here we describe a pure strategy ﬁnite automaton review type with
shortfall at most ǫ which we denote as ωǫ. If a stage game has LNCI, then there exists a







2) < −Ml(P + 1)
52for any a2 ∈ A2 such that g1(as
1,a2) < 0 and a′
2 ∈ A2.
In the following we ﬁrst consider a KJ-fold ﬁnitely repeated game ΓKJ(δ).36 We partition
ΓKJ into blocks of length J, ΓJ,k, k = 1,...,K. Let uk
i denote player i’s time average payoﬀ in
block ΓJ,k and let uKJ
i (δ) denote player i’s discounted payoﬀ in the KJ-fold ﬁnitely repeated
game ΓKJ(δ). Let σKJ
1 be the following strategy: in block ΓJ,1 player one plays as
1 in each
period. We call a block where player one chooses to play as
1 in each period a review phase.
In the beginning of block ΓJ,2, player one reviews play in the previous block. If u1
1 ≥ −η,
then player one again chooses to play as
1 in each period of block ΓJ,2 and so on. If for any
k, uk
1 < −η, then player 1 plays action a
p
1, for the next P repetitions of ΓJ,k and then plays
as
1 in ΓJ,k+P+1. We call the blocks where player one chooses to play a
p
1 in each period a
“punishment phase”.
Lemma B.10 Given ǫ > 0 there are numbers η(ǫ), K(ǫ), J(ǫ) and discount factor δ(ǫ)
such that for any δ > δ(ǫ) and for any best response σ∗
2 to σ
K(ǫ)J(ǫ)







Proof: This construction is directly taken from Celentani et al. (1996) Lemma 4. A proof
can be found in the appendix of Celentani et al. (1996). ￿
Definition B.3 (Review type) Let σ∗
1 denote the repeated game strategy that inﬁnitely
repeats the strategy σ
K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
1 , that is, σ∗
1 plays according to σ
K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
1 in periods 1 through
K(ǫ)J(ǫ), then again plays according to σ
K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
1 , in periods K(ǫ)J(ǫ)+1 through 2K(ǫ)J(ǫ)
and so on. The type ωǫ is the ﬁnite automaton which implements σ∗
1 with a minimal number
of states.
The following lemma is a strengthened version of Lemma B.9 which holds for any review
type.
Lemma B.11 (Unit cost lemma for the review type) For each ǫ > 0, there exists δǫ ∈ [0,1)
such that for all δ > δǫ
(i) UC
1 (ωǫ,δ) > −ǫ,
(ii) If U1(ωǫ,σ2,δ) = −ǫ − r and r > 0, then U2(ωǫ,σ2,δ) ≤ ρǫ − lr.
Proof: Pick δǫ > δ(ǫ) where δ(ǫ) is the cutoﬀ identiﬁed in Lemma B.10. Part (i) follows
immediately from Lemma B.10. Proof of part (ii) is as follows: The fact that inequality (16)
36This development closely follows Celentani et al. (1996), Lemma 4. Also, see the lemma’s proof in that
paper’s appendix.















2) < −lMJ(ǫ)(P + 1)
for all δ > δ∗. Also, pick δǫ to be strictly greater than δ∗, i.e., δǫ > max{δ(ǫ),δ∗}. For public









−η(ǫ) and period t is the start of a review stage; and i(ht) = 0, otherwise. If i(ht+J(ǫ)−1) = 1,
then player 1 receives at least −M in period t through period t + J(ǫ) + J(ǫ)P − 1. Con-
sequently, U1(ωǫ,σ2,δ) ≥ −η(ǫ) − J(ǫ)(1 + P)(1 − δ)M(Eωǫ,σ2 [
 ∞
t=0 δti(ht)]). By construc-
tion η(ǫ) < ǫ and so (1 − δ)E(ωǫ,σ2) [
 ∞
t=0 δti(ht)] ≥ r/J(ǫ)(1 + P)M. If i(ht+J(ǫ)−1) = 1,
then player two receives a total discounted payoﬀ of at most −J(ǫ)(P + 1)l(1 − δ) for
periods t through t + J(ǫ)(P + 1) − 1, if δ > δǫ by equation (17). In any block where
player one receives at least −η(ǫ), player two receives at most ρη(ǫ) < ρǫ. Consequently,
U2(ωǫ,σ2) ≤ ǫρ − J(ǫ)(1 + P)l(1 − δ)E(ωǫ,σ2) [
 ∞
t=0 δti(ht)] ≤ ǫρ − lr, if δ > δǫ. ￿
B.4.2. Reputation bound for review types. In the following we establish a reputation bound,
Lemma B.12, for the review type described above. The reputation bound is similar to Lemma
2 and the proof of the bound also uses Lemma B.1 and Lemma A.2 as the main building
blocks.
Definition B.4 For any integer n ≥ 1, deﬁne W n as the set of all ﬁnite automaton which
have fewer states than ωǫ/n and deﬁne W n,n = {W : W ⊂ W n,|W| ≤ n} as the set of all
subsets of W n with cardinality not more than n.
The following lemma presents the reputation bound for the review type. We use this lemma
extensively in constructing ω∗.
Lemma B.12 Given n ≥ 1 and T ≥ 1, suppose that ω(n,T) is a ﬁnite automaton whose
strategy coincides with ωǫ/n after period T. There exists a δ(n,T) < 1 such that for any
z > 0, any   ∈ ∆ω(n,T),z, any δ ≥ δ(n,T), any set W ⊂ W n,n, and any σ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ,δ))
the following inequality is satisﬁed:
U1(σ,δ) > −2ǫ/n −
ǫ/n +  (Ω \ W)
z
f(l,z),
where l is the constant given in Lemma B.11 and f is the function deﬁned in Lemma B.1.
Proof: Clearly, there is a cutoﬀ δ such that for all discount factors that exceed this cutoﬀ,
the conclusions of Lemma B.11 hold for ω(n,T).
54Notice that ¯ p(W n,ωǫ/n) = ξ > 0, this is because ωǫ/n / ∈ W n and because W n is a compact










> 1 − ǫ/n,
for any t ≥ N. Such a N exists by Lemma A.2 and only depends on ǫ, T, and n. The result
then follows from Lemma B.1 and is analogous to the proof of Lemma 2. ￿
In what follows, we drop the reference to l in f(l,z) because the uniform cost l we use (as
deﬁned in Lemma B.11) for establishing the above bound for ω(n,T) is always the same for
any n and any T.
B.4.3. Constructing type ω∗. The type ω∗ starts by playing a strategy that coincides with
the strategy of the review type with shortfall at most ǫ, i.e., ωǫ, for T1 periods, then plays
a strategy that coincides with the strategy of the review type with shortfall at most ǫ/2 for
T2 periods, and plays a strategy that coincides with the strategy of the review type with
shortfall at most ǫ/n for Tn periods, and so on. Therefore, this type is identiﬁed by a sequence
of period lengths, T1,T2,..,Tn,... which we will pick recursively. We will also simultaneously
pick a sequence of intervals of discount factors, [δ1, ¯ δ1],[δ2, ¯ δ2],..., such that limi→∞ δi = 1.
Definition B.5 ΓN(δ, ) is a N period repeated game, where the stage game is Γ. The
types in ΓN(δ, ) belong to the set ΩN that is obtained as follows: For every ω ∈ Ω, there
exists a corresponding ωN whose strategy coincides with the strategy of ω during the ﬁnitely
repeated game, i.e., ωN is the projection of the inﬁnitely repeated game strategy ω on the ﬁrst
N periods. Moreover, the probability of ωN in the beginning of the ﬁnitely repeated game is
 (ω).
Definition B.6 For any ξ > 0, let NEξ(ΓN( ,δ)) denote the set of ξ Bayes-Nash equilibria
of the ﬁnitely repeated game ΓN( ,δ) (see Radner (1981)).
For the following, recall that δǫ/n is the cutoﬀ level of the discount factor that achieves
the desiderata of Lemma B.11. (i.e., the δǫ/n in Lemma B.11 that exists for the review type
with shortfall at most ǫ/n). Notice that δ(n,T) ≥ δǫ/n.
Lemma B.13 Suppose that [δ, ¯ δ] ⊂ [δ(n,T),1). Then there exists a ξ([δ, ¯ δ]) > 0 and an
integer T ∗([δ, ¯ δ]) such that: for any z > 0, any   ∈ ∆ω(n,T),z, any set W ∈ W n,n, any
δ ∈ [δ, ¯ δ], any ξ ≤ ξ([δ, ¯ δ]), any N ≥ T ∗([δ, ¯ δ]), and any σ ∈ NEξ(ΓN( ,δ)) the following
55inequality is satisﬁed:
U1(σ,δ) ≥ −3ǫ/n −
ǫ/n +  (Ω \ W)
z
f(z).
Proof: On the way to a contradiction, suppose that the lemma is not true. Then we can
pick a convergent sequence of ξk, discount factors, sets of ﬁnite automata, priors, and strategy
proﬁles {ξk,δk, k,Wk,zk,σk}∞
k=1 with ξk > 0 and limk→∞ ξk = 0, δk ∈ [δ, ¯ δ],  k ∈ ∆ω(n,T),zk,
Wk ∈ W n,n and σk ∈ NEξk(Γk( k,δk)) such that
U1(σk,δk) < −3ǫ/n − f(zk)
ǫ/n +  k(Ω \ Wk)
zk
.
Let the limit of the sequence be {0,δ, ,W,z,σ} satisfying δ ∈ [δ, ¯ δ] and   ∈ ∆ω(n,T),z.37 We
have σ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ,δ)) since limk→∞ξk = 0 and all other terms converge to a limit.38
We will now consider two cases: First, if z = 0, then the right hand side of the displayed
inequality in the lemma will be arbitrarily small because f(0) = ∞. However U1(σk,δk) is
bounded below a ﬁnite number since player 1’s minimax is a ﬁnite number. So it cannot




Choosing T1 and the interval [δ1, ¯ δ1]. We pick δ1 > δ(1,0) and ¯ δ1 > δǫ/2. Hence, the interval
[δ1, ¯ δ1] satisﬁes the hypothesis of Lemma B.13. By Lemma B.13 there exists a ξ > 0 and
integer T ∗ such that for any z > 0, any   ∈ ∆ω(1,0),z, any set W ∈ W 1,1, any δ ∈ [δ1, ¯ δ1], any
T ≥ T ∗, and any σ ∈ NEξ(ΓT( ,δ)) the following inequality is satisﬁed:
U1(σ,δ) ≥ −3ǫ −




We pick T1 so that T1 ≥ T ∗ and ¯ δ
T1
1 M ≤ min{ǫ,ξ}. Consequently, we have the following:
Remark 5 Let ω be an inﬁnitely repeated game strategy that coincides with ω(1,0) during
the ﬁrst T1 periods. We claim that for any δ ∈ [δ1, ¯ δ1], any W ∈ W 1,1, any z > 0, any
  ∈ ∆ω,z and any σ that is a NE proﬁle of Γ∞( ,δ)
U1(σ,δ) ≥ −4ǫ −




37We use the Euclidean distance for ξk,δk, and inherent product topology for convergence of  k and
the strategies σk.
38This is standard see for instance Myerson (1991) page 144, Theorem 3.4 or Fudenberg and Levine (1986)
Proposition 4.1.
56Proof: Let σT1 be the projection of σ on the ﬁrst T1 periods. Since ¯ δ
T1
1 M ≤ ξ, σT1 is a ξ
Bayes Nash equilibrium of ΓT1( ,δ). Therefore U1(σT1,δ) > −3ǫ −
ǫ+ (Ω\W)
z f(z) by Lemma
B.13. We now use the inequality ¯ δ
T1
1 ≤ ǫ to argue that |U1(σ,δ) − U1(σT1,δ)| ≤ ¯ δ
T1
1 M ≤ ǫ
and we conclude that U1(σ,δ) ≥ −4ǫ −
ǫ+ (Ω\W)
z f(z). ￿
Now we choose Tn and the interval [δn, ¯ δn] given {T1,...,Tn−1} and {[δ1, ¯ δ1],...,[δn−1, ¯ δn−1]}.
Let ˆ Tn =
 n−1
i=1 Ti. For n = 1, deﬁne the strategy Dǫ/n := ωǫ and for n > 1, deﬁne Dǫ/n
recursively as follows: Dǫ/n coincides with Dǫ/(n−1) up to a time ˆ Tn and then coincides with
ωǫ/n.
Lemma B.14 Suppose that [δ, ¯ δ] ⊂ [max{δǫ/n,δ(n−1, ˆ Tn−1)},1). Then there exists a ξ([δ, ¯ δ]) >
0 and an integer T ∗([δ, ¯ δ]) such that: for any z > 0, any   ∈ ∆Dǫ/n,z, any set W ∈ W n−1,n−1,
any δ ∈ [δ, ¯ δ], any ξ ≤ ξ([δ, ¯ δ]), any T ≥ T ∗([δ, ¯ δ]), and any σ ∈ NEξ(ΓT( ,δ)) the following
inequality is satisﬁed:
U1(σ,δ) ≥ −3ǫ/(n − 1) −
ǫ/(n − 1) +  (Ω \ W)
z
f(z).
Proof: This argument is similar to the argument for Lemma B.13. We again obtain a
contradiction to Lemma B.12. We arrive at the contradiction by using the facts that for
all δ ≥ max{δǫ/n,δ(n − 1, ˆ Tn−1)} we have ﬁrst UC
1 (Dǫ/n,δ) > −ǫ/(n − 1), and second if
U1(Dǫ/n,σ2,δ) = −ǫ/(n − 1) − r and r > 0, then U2(Dǫ/n,σ2,δ) ≤ ρǫ/(n − 1) − lr. In other
words the conclusions of Lemma B.11 hold and thus Lemma B.12 applies for Dǫ/n. ￿
We pick interval of discount factors [δn, ¯ δn] as follows: Let δn be such that δn > ¯ δn−1
and δn > δ(n, ˆ Tn), and for the upper end, ¯ δn > δn, ¯ δn > δǫ/(n+1). Notice that the interval
[δn, ¯ δn] satisﬁes the hypothesis of Lemma B.13 by construction because δn > δ(n, ˆ Tn). Also,
the interval [¯ δn−1, ¯ δn] satisﬁes the hypothesis of Lemma B.14 by construction because ¯ δn−1 ≥
max{δǫ/n,δ(n − 1, ˆ Tn−1)}.
We now pick T n. Let ξ∗ > 0 be the cutoﬀ ξ([¯ δn−1, ¯ δn]) obtained in Lemma B.14, ξ∗∗ > 0
be the cutoﬀ ξ([δn, ¯ δn]) obtained in Lemma B.13, and let ξn := min{ξ∗,ξ∗∗,ǫ/n)} > 0. First,
Lemma B.13 implies that there exists T ∗∗ such that for all δ ∈ [δn, ¯ δn], all N ≥ T ∗∗ + ˆ Tn, all
W ∈ W n,n, all   ∈ ∆Dǫ/n,z and all σN ∈ NEξn(ΓN( ,δ))
(18) U1(σN,δ) > −3ǫ/n − f(z)
ǫ/n +  (Ω \ W)
z
.
Second, Lemma B.14 implies that there exists T ∗∗∗ such that for all δ ∈ [δn−1, ¯ δn], all N ≥
57T ∗∗∗ + ˆ Tn, all W ∈ W n−1,n−1, all   ∈ ∆Dǫ/n,z and all σN ∈ NEξn(ΓN( ,δ))
(19) U1(σN,δ) > −3ǫ/(n − 1) − f(z)
ǫ/(n − 1) +  (Ω \ W)
z
.
We pick Tn such that Tn ≥ max{T ∗∗,T ∗∗∗} and ¯ δ
ˆ Tn+Tn
n M < min{ξn,ǫ/n}.
Lemma B.15 Suppose that ω that coincides with Dǫ/n during the periods zero through
ˆ Tn + Tn. For all W ∈ W n−1,n−1, all z > 0, all   ∈ ∆ω,z, all δ ∈ [δn−1, ¯ δn], and all
σ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ,δ)), we have
(20) U1(σ,δ) > −4ǫ/(n − 1) − f(z)
ǫ/(n − 1) +  (Ω \ W)
z
.
Proof: Let σ be a NE of Γ∞( ,δ) for some δ ∈ [δn−1, ¯ δn]. Our choice of Tn was such
that ¯ δ
ˆ Tn+Tn
n M < min{ξn,ǫ/n}. Therefore, if δ ≤ ¯ δn, then the projection of σ on the ﬁrst
N = ˆ Tn +Tn periods, σN is a ξn Bayes-Nash equilibrium of ΓN( ,δ). Therefore, inequalities




n M < ǫ/n, the payoﬀs after period N aﬀect player 1’s payoﬀs by at most ǫ/n as
long as δ ≤ ¯ δn. Hence, U1(σ,δ) ≥ U1(σN,δ) − ǫ/(n − 1). ￿
B.4.4. Completing the proof of Theorem 1.
Proof: We show that if   ∈ ∆ω∗,z, z > 0, and all the commitment types other than ω∗
in the support of   are ﬁnite automata, then, UNE
1 ( ) = 0. Fix any χ > 0. There exists an
n > 1 and a W ∈ W n−1,n−1 such that for every n′ ≥ n, 4ǫ
n′−1 + f(z)
ǫ/(n′−1)+ (Ω\W)
z < χ. This
follows from the fact that Ω is a countable set of ﬁnite automata. Also, by Lemma B.15,
U1(σ,δ) ≥ − 4ǫ
n−1 −f(z)
ǫ/(n−1)+ (Ω\W)
z , for any δ ≥ δn, and any σ ∈ NE(Γ∞( ,δ)). Therefore,
we have the following inequalities:





ǫ/(n − 1) +  (Ω \ W)
z
≥ −χ.
Since χ is arbitrary, liminfδ→1,σ∈NE(Γ∞( ,δ)) U1(σ,δ) = UNE
1 ( ) = 0. ￿
C. Proofs of Theorem 2 and Lemma 3
We start by proving Theorem 2. The proof of Lemma 3 is similar and we indicate the
changes in Theorem 2 that delivers lemma 3. We normalize the minimax payoﬀ of player 1
58to zero, i.e., ˆ g1 = 0. Moreover we normalize player one’s highest IR payoﬀ, ¯ g1 = 1.39 Given a
ﬁnite automaton ω, recall that ωθ denotes an automaton which is identical to ω except for
its initial state. We will ﬁrst assume that ωθ is irreducible. We dispense this assumption in
subsection C.4.
C.1. Notation. We denote the set of perfect public equilibrium (PPE) payoﬀs of Γ∞(δ)
by V (δ). We deﬁne the minimum payoﬀ of player 1 across all payoﬀ proﬁles in V (δ) as
U
low
1 (δ) := min{u1|∃u2 ∈ R s.t. u = (u1,u2) ∈ V (δ)}.
Deﬁne u
+
2 (u1,δ) = max{u2 : (u1,u2) ∈ V (δ)} and u
−
2 (u1,δ) = min{u2 : (u1,u2) ∈ V (δ)} as
the highest and lowest equilibrium payoﬀs of player two consistent with player one receiving
a payoﬀ equal to u1.40 For any θ ∈ Θ, let U2(ωθ,δ) := maxσ2∈Σ2 U2(ωθ,σ2,δ) denote player
2’s best payoﬀ when her opponent plays the automaton strategy that starts at state θ ∈ Θ.
Let ε > 0 be the target upper bound on player one’s equilibrium payoﬀ in our construction.
We choose ε ≤ UC
1 (ω) because otherwise there is nothing to prove. We pick d > 0 such that
d < minθ∈Θ limδ→1 1 − UC
1 (ωθ,δ).41 Therefore d is a lower bound on the shortfalls of all
commitment types ωθ for θ ∈ Θ.
Assumption NI and Fudenberg et al. (1994)’s Folk Theorem together imply that there





2 (u1,δ) > v(ε,d) for every u1 ∈ [ε,1 − d].
C.2. Review strategy proﬁles. We now describe a particular set of strategy proﬁles
that we call review strategy proﬁles and denote by R. Subsets of this set are indexed by
δ ∈ (0,1) as well as the following set of parameters: z ∈ [0,1] which denotes the probability
of the commitment type ω, n ∈ N which denotes the maximum number of review phases the
strategy has, e ∈ R which denotes the cutoﬀ level that deﬁnes “passing” and “failing” the
test (described further below), and r ∈ (0,1) which is a measure of the length of the test
phase. Hence R(δ,z,n,e,r) denotes a typical set of review strategy proﬁles. With every such
set, there is an associated integer, T(δ), which is the largest integer such that δT ≥ r.42 The
number T is the duration of each test phase of the strategy proﬁle.
39This normalization is without loss as long as ¯ g1 > ˆ g1 in Γ. We do not consider the uninteresting case
where ˆ g1 = ¯ g1.
40 The PPE payoﬀ set V (δ) is compact, hence the max and min of the sets exist.
41This limit exists by Lemma A.3.
42T(δ) := max{t ∈ N : δT ≥ r}, where the number r is the last argument in the set R. To save on notation,
we sometimes refer to T(δ) as simply T.
59C.2.1. The description of a review strategy proﬁle with one review phase. We ﬁrst describe
a review strategy proﬁle σ ∈ R(δ,z,n = 1,e,r) on the equilibrium path. Then, we describe
the oﬀ equilibrium path behavior of a review strategy proﬁle σ. Throughout this description,
we required that if player two’s strategy σ2 is part of a review strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1,σ2),
then σ2 is a best response to σ1 at every history ht
2 ∈ H2.
Equilibrium path play and phases. A review strategy proﬁle has three phases. The ﬁrst is
the test phase which begins in period 0 and lasts through period T − 1. The second is the
revelation phase and takes place in period T. The third is the execution phase and includes
all periods after period T.
Test Phase: For t ∈ {0,1,...,T−1}, σ1(ht) = o(θt), i.e., player one mimics the commitment





1,ys) > e, i.e., if player one’s payoﬀ during the test phase exceeds
the threshold e. Otherwise, we say that player two passed the test.
Revelation phase (or period): In period T, σ1(hT)(  a1(θT)) = σ1(hT)(o(θT)) = 1/2 where
  a1 : Θ → A1 is a function such that   a1(θ)  = o(θ) for every θ ∈ Θ which we term a
revelation rule for player one. In words, the normal type of player one, with equal probability,
either reveals rationality by playing the revelation action   a1(θT) or alternatively mimics the
commitment strategy by playing o(θT).
Execution phase: The play in the execution phase depends on the action taken by player
one in the revelation period, i.e., aT
1. If aT
1 = o(θT), then σ1|hT+1 coincides with ωθT+1 on the
equilibrium path.43 In words, if at the revelation phase player one has not revealed rationality,
then player one will mimic the commitment type forever. Moreover, we require that σ2|hT+1
satisﬁes U1(ωθT+1,σ2|hT+1) = UC
1 (ωθT+1,δ), i.e., σ2|hT+1 is the best response to ωθT+1 which
minimizes player one’s continuation payoﬀ.
If aT
1 =   a1(θT), then we consider two alternatives. First, if player two has failed the test,
then continuation play is given by a strategy proﬁle σ|hT+1 = (σ1|hT+1,σ2|hT+1) which sustains





,U2(θT,fail,δ)) in the complete information game Γ∞(δ), where
UR
1 (θT,δ) is chosen as the continuation payoﬀ that makes player one indiﬀerent at time T












further elaborate on UR
1 (θT,δ) in the paragraph below. Second, if player two passed the test,
then continuation play is given by a strategy proﬁle σ|hT+1 = (σ1|hT+1,σ2|hT+1) which sustains
























1 (θi,δ) denote player one’s continuation payoﬀ, at
43σ1|hT+1 diﬀers from ωθT+1 at histories oﬀ the equilibrium path. We describe the strategy oﬀ the equi-
librium path in the next subsection.
60the beginning of the revelation phase, from not revealing rationality.44 Hence:
U
NR






where θ′ is the state of the automaton at the beginning of period T + 1 under the strat-
egy proﬁle (ωθi,σ2). Let UREV
1 (θi,δ) denote player one’s continuation payoﬀ from revealing
rationality at the revelation phase. Hence:
U
REV








where the payoﬀ UR
1 (θi,δ) is the continuation payoﬀ player one gets starting from period
T + 1 if he reveals rationality. The continuation payoﬀ UR
1 (θi,δ) is the payoﬀ that makes
player one indiﬀerent at time T between revealing rationality by playing   a1(θi) and not
revealing rationality by playing o(θi). More precisely,
U
R














This choice of continuation payoﬀs ensures that UNR
1 (θi,δ) = UREV
1 (θi,δ). Hence, player one
is indiﬀerent between revealing rationality or not revealing rationality. Moreover, UR
1 (θi,δ)
















Oﬀ equilibrium play. Note that the full support assumption ensures that player two’s
deviations are not detectable, hence we only consider player one’s deviations. Deviations by
player one from the equilibrium path described above will trigger continuation play that
gives player one a payoﬀ of Ulow
1 (δ). Note a deviation by player one at or before time t = T
reveals his rationality and hence the continuation game is a game of complete information.
If aT
1 = o(θT), then a deviation in period t > T also reveals player one’s rationality and
again a strategy proﬁle that yields a continuation payoﬀ of Ulow
1 (δ) is played. If aT
1 =   a1(θT),
then behavior after a deviation is already captured by the strategy proﬁle of the complete
information game.
Payoﬀ bounds for review strategy proﬁles. The results of this section deliver bounds on the
players’ payoﬀs if they play a review strategy proﬁle. These bounds are implied by the fact
that player two’s strategy is a best response to player one’s strategy as well as the structure
of the review strategy proﬁle. Using these bounds, we verify that the review strategy proﬁle
is a PPE in the subsequent subsection.
The lemmata C.1 and C.2 together show that player one’s discounted average payoﬀs
44 This payoﬀ function depends on σ. We suppress this dependence to keep the notation easier.




where v := v(ε,d). Lemma C.3 uses Lemmata C.1 and C.2 to calculate an upper bound on a
suﬃciently patient player one’s payoﬀ from the review strategy proﬁle. This bound is strictly
lower than the commitment payoﬀ.
The next lemma says that player two’s payoﬀs diﬀer across passing and failing the test
during the review phase by at least (1 − z)v/2.




















Proof: The proof is in two steps. The ﬁrst step shows that the second term of the left
hand side of the inequality disappears when δ goes to one. The second step argues that the
ﬁrst term of the left hand side is bounded below by v as δ goes to one.
Step 1: limδ→1 |minθ U2(ωθ,δ) − maxθ U2(ωθ,δ)| = 0. This step follows from Lemma A.3.
Step 2: liminfδ→1 (minθ U2(θ,pass,δ) − maxθ U2(θ,fail,δ)) > v. First note that any com-
pact and convex subset of the set of strictly IR payoﬀs is contained in the set of equilibrium
payoﬀs of Γ∞(δ) as δ → 1, by Fudenberg et al. (1994). By the full support assumption,
we have limδ→1 max(θi,θj)∈Θ×Θ
 
UC
1 (ωθi,δ) − UC
1 (ωθj,δ)
 
= 0 and limδ→1 supθi∈Θ UC
1 (ωθi,δ) ≤
1 − d. Hence, using the deﬁnition of UR
1 (θi,δ) implies that:
U
R
















we ﬁnd that limδ→1 max(θi,θj)∈Θ×Θ
 
 UR
1 (θi,δ) − UR
1 (θj,δ)
 
  = 0 and that limδ→1 supθi UR
1 (θi,δ) ≤




















And since the set of equilirium payoﬀ set converges to the set of IR payoﬀ set, we have
liminfδ→1 (minθ U2(θ,pass,δ) − maxθ U2(θ,fail,δ)) > v. ￿




























2 : A1 → A2 be the mapping that satisﬁes u1(a1,a
nasty
2 (a1)) ≤ 0. Such an
action for player two exists, for every a1 ∈ A1 since player one’s minmax is 0. Let σ
nasty
2 (δ)
be the strategy such that σ
nasty
2 (δ)(ht) = a
nasty
2 (o(θt)) for any public history ht.
First, we state the following identity without an argument. We prove this identity in












































then a deviation from σ2(δ) during the ﬁrst T(δ) periods to σ
nasty
2 (δ), and starting from T(δ)
sticking with σ2(δ) is a proﬁtable deviation, provided δ is suﬃciently high.


















and Pσ(δ)(pass) := 1 − Pσ(δ)(fail).
Let loss(δ) of the strategy σ
nasty
2 (δ) be the diﬀerence in player 2’s expected discounted
payoﬀs during the periods t ∈ {0,1,...,T(δ) − 1} between employing the strategy σ2(δ) and
σ
nasty
2 (δ) against the commitment type strategy. Note that, the diﬀerence in player 2’s payoﬀs
when she follows the strategy σ2(δ) and σ
nasty
2 (δ) is at most 2M at every period of the ﬁrst T
periods. So the loss, loss(δ) is at most 2M(1−δT(δ)). The gain of using the strategy σ
nasty
2 (δ),























































We will now show that liminfδ→1 gain(δ) − limsupδ→1 loss(δ) > 0. This will complete
the proof since showing this amounts to showing that employing σ
nasty
2 (δ) is a proﬁtable

















2 (δ)(pass) = 1,
i.e., the strategy σ
nasty
2 passes the review test with a probability that approaches to one (this





















By step 2 in the proof of Lemma C.1, we have that limδ→1(minθ U2(θ,pass,δ)−maxθ U2(θ,fail,δ)) ≥
v. Also, limδ→1 δT(δ)+1 = r, because T(δ) was chosen as the largest integer that satisﬁes
δT(δ) ≥ r.
Hence, if the supposition that limsupδ→1 Pσ(δ)(fail) > e is true, then liminfδ→1 gain(δ) ≥
(1−z)rve
2 . On the other side, limsupδ→1 loss(δ) ≤ 2M(1 − r). But if r > 2M
2M+ 1
2(1−z)ve, then
limsupδ→1 loss(δ) < liminfδ→1 gain(δ), completing the proof. ￿
Lemma C.3 If r > 2M
2M+ 1
2(1−z)ve, then limsupδ→1,σ∈R(δ,z,1,e,r)U1(σ,δ) ≤ r(1 − d) + (1 −
64r)(e(2 − e)).











































Hence, limsupδ→1 U1(σ,δ) ≤ (1 − r)(e(2 − e)) + r(1 − d). ￿
Veriﬁcation that σ(δ) ∈ R(δ,z,1,e,r) is an equilibrium.
Now we verify that any σ(δ) ∈ R(δ,z,1,e,r) is a PPE of Γ∞(z,δ) if r > 2M
2M+ 1
2(1−z)ve if
the players are suﬃciently patient.







, then there exists δ∗ < 1 such that for every
δ > δ∗ any σ ∈ R(δ,z,1,e,r) is a PPE of Γ∞(z,δ).
Proof: Let O(δ) represent terms for which limsupδ→1 O(δ) = 0. Note that limδ→1 Ulow
1 (δ) =
0, because the folk theorem of Fudenberg et al. (1994) says that player one’s lowest PPE pay-
oﬀ in Γ∞(δ) goes to his minimax. However, for any σ ∈ R(δ,z,1,e,r) player one’s payoﬀ
on the equilibrium path of σ is bounded below by −2M(1 − r) + rUC
1 (ω) + O(1 − δ) ≥
−2M(1−r)+rε+O(1−δ), which is strictly positive if r > 2M
2M+ε and if δ is suﬃciently close
to one. Hence deviations from σ1 are deterred by the threat of Ulow
1 (δ) when δ is suﬃciently
large. Therefore, σ1 is a best response to σ2 at every history. Also, player two’s strategy is
by deﬁnition a best response to player one’s strategy since σ ∈ R(δ,z,1,e,r). ￿
C.2.2. The description of an n-step review strategy proﬁle. We describe σ ∈ R(δ,z,n,e,r)
recursively, i.e., for n > 1, when stating the properties of the n step review strategy after
the ﬁrst revelation phase, we use the term (n−1) step review strategy proﬁle when referring
to the continuation strategy proﬁle. Throughout this description, we required that if player
two’s strategy σ2 is part of a review strategy proﬁle σ = (σ1,σ2), then σ2 is a best response
to σ1 at every history ht
2 ∈ H2.







be an n − 1 step review strategy proﬁle such that








Let   a1 : Θ → Ai be a revelation rule with   a1(θ)  = o(θ) for every θ ∈ Θ.
Phases on the equilibrium path.
Test phase: For t ∈ {0,1,...,T −1}, σ1(ht) = o(θt), i.e., player 1 fully mimics the commit-






1,ys) > e, then player two
fails the test. Otherwise, player two passes the test.
65Revelation phase: At t = T, σ1(hT)(  a1(θT)) = σ1(hT)(o(θT)) =
1
2. In words, the normal
type of player one reveals rationality by playing the revelation action   a1(θT), or mimics the
commitment strategy with equal probabilities.
Execution phase: If aT
1 = o(θT), then σ1(ht) = o(θt) for t ∈ {T + 1,....,τ − 1} where τ is
the ﬁrst time greater than or equal to T + 1 for which θτ = θ0. 45 Moreover, σ|hτ = σNR.
If aT
1 =   a1(θT), then there are two alternatives: First, if player two fails the test, then
continuation play is given by σ|hT+1 = (σ1|hT+1,σ2|hT+1) which is a strategy proﬁle that






















































Second, if player two passes the test, then continuation play is given by σhT+1 = (σ1|hT+1,σ2|hT+1)
















Oﬀ equilibrium play. Deviations by player one from the equilibrium path described above
will trigger continuation play that gives player one a payoﬀ of Ulow
1 (δ). Note that deviations
by player one at or before time t = T, reveal his rationality, hence the continuation game
is a game of complete information. Deviations at periods t > T if aT
1 = o(θT) then reveal
rationality, hence a strategy proﬁle that yields a continuation payoﬀ of Ulow
1 (δ) is played. If
aT
1 =   a1(θT), then behavior after deviations are already captured by the strategy proﬁle of
the complete information game.
Payoﬀ bounds for review strategy proﬁles. The results that follow deliver bounds on the
players’ payoﬀs if they play a review strategy proﬁle, if the players are suﬃciently patient,







. These bounds are implied by the fact that
player two’s strategy is a best response to player one’s strategy as well as the structure of
the review strategy proﬁle.
The following lemma shows that in the limit as players get arbitrarily patient, UR
1 and
45We use the convention that if τ = T + 1, then the set {T + 1,...,τ − 1} = ∅.
46Note that as in the n = 1 case, UR
1 (θT,δ) is deﬁned as the payoﬀ that makes player one indiﬀerent
between revealing rationality and mimicking w, at the revelation period T. The payoﬀ depends on the state
of the automaton at period T because i) player two’s action at T, and the revelation action depend on the
state of the automaton at T ii) the payoﬀs until the state of the automaton reaches θ0 depend on the state
of the automaton at period T.
66player two’s continuation payoﬀs don’t change with the state of the automaton at the reve-
lation revelation phase. The second lemma shows that player one’s continuation payoﬀ from
mimicking the commitment type doesn’t depend on the state of the automaton, in the limit
as players are arbitrarily patient.
Lemma C.5 i)limδ→1 supθi,θj∈Θ
   UR
1 (θi,δ) − UR
1 (θj,δ)
    = 0, ii) limδ→1 supθi,θj∈Θ |U2(θi,∆,δ)−
U2(θj,∆,δ)| = 0 for ∆ ∈ {pass,fail}.




























i (hT,δ) − Ui(σNR,δ)
 
  = 0.
Proof: The term UNR
i (hT,δ) depends on hT only through θT, since the continuation
strategy of player 1 coincides with the commitment strategy until the ﬁrst time the state of
the automaton becomes θ0. The expected time it takes to reach to state θ0 is bounded by a
number K (also see Lemma A.3), therefore as δ → 1, the payoﬀs until the state reaches θ0
have an aﬀect of at most K(1 − δ)M on the total discounted payoﬀ. ￿
The following lemma shows that, as players get arbitrarily patient, player two gains a
payoﬀ of at least
(1−z)v
2 if she passes the test instead of failing it. Note that the gain in
the payoﬀ is the multiplication of the probability that her opponent reveals rationality at
the end of the test phase by v, where v is a lower bound on the diﬀerence on player two’s
continuation payoﬀs at histories followed by player one revealing his rationality.


































2 (hT,δ) − U2(σNR,δ)
 




















  = 0.
For the ﬁrst term on the LHS of the inequality, note that limδ→1 supθi
 
 UNR
1 (θi,δ) − U1(σNR,δ)
 
  =







is chosen to satisfy U1(σNR) ∈




2 (U1(σNR),δ) > v and there-
fore minθ U2(θ,pass,δ) − maxθ U2(θ,fail,δ) > v and the result follows. ￿
Lemma C.8 Suppose that r > 2M
2M+ 1
2(1−z)ve. Then there exits a cutoﬀ δ∗ < 1 such that for


























< e + O(1 − δ).
Proof: This lemma’s proof is identical to the proof of Lemma C.2. ￿
Lemma C.9 Suppose that r > max
2M
2M+ 1






























































. For any σ∗ ∈ R(δ,z,n,e,r), conditional
on player two passing the test, player one receives a discounted payoﬀ of at most e(1 − δT)
during the ﬁrst T periods and conditional on player two failing the test at most 1(1 − δT).
Also, U1(σNR,δ) ∈ [ǫ,1−d] in the proﬁle σ∗. Consequently, writing the upperbound of player
68one’s payoﬀ for σ∗ gives us the following inequalities:
U1(σ






























￿U1(σ,δ) + O(1 − δ).
Therefore, we have either the following inequality:















￿U1(σ,δ). Hence, the result follows by tak-
ing the limits. ￿
C.3. Completing the proof of Theorem 2.
Proof: We will show the following: For every ǫ > 0, there exists a z∗ ∈ (0,1) such that for
every z ∈ (0,z∗) there exists a cutoﬀ δ∗ < 1 such that for every δ > δ∗ there exists a PPE σ
of Γ∞(z,δ) for which U1(σ,δ) ≤ ǫ.
Note that limδ→1 Ulow
1 (δ) = 0, by Fudenberg et al. (1994)’s folk theorem. We’ll show that
on the equilibrium path player one’s continuation payoﬀs are always at least ǫ
2 for all discount
factors above a critical level, and hence in this case he has no proﬁtable deviations. To show
that his continuation payoﬀs are at least ǫ
2, we put a lower bound on his payoﬀs at the start
of the review phases, and this lower bound constitutes a lower bound on his continuation
payoﬀs at every period during the test phase. The lower bound is found by applying Lemma
C.9 successively starting from review strategy proﬁles with one phase, i.e., n = 1.











. Deﬁne the sequence of bounds {bj}j∈{0,1,...} recursively
as b0 = 1 − d and bj = (1 − r(ǫ))ǫ
2(2 − ǫ
2) + r(ǫ)bj−1 for j ≥ 1. Since r(ǫ) ∈ (0,1), and
ǫ
2(2 − ǫ
2) < ǫ, there exists n(ǫ) such that bn(ǫ) < ǫ and bn(ǫ)−1 ≥ ǫ. Now deﬁne a sequence of





for i ≥ 1. We
set z∗ = zn(ǫ).
We claim that there exists δ∗ < 1 such that for every δ > δ∗, any σ ∈ R(δ,z,n(ǫ), ǫ
2,r(ǫ))
is a PPE of Γ∞(z,δ) and U1(σ,δ) ≤ ǫ. The fact that U1(σ,δ) ≤ ǫ follows from Lemma




for every z ≤ 1/2, and
noting that there exists δ∗∗ < 1 such that for δ > δ∗∗, for any j < n(ǫ), and for any
σ′ ∈ R(δ,z,j,
ǫ





. Player one has no proﬁtable deviations,
because on the equilibrium path player one receives a payoﬀ of (1−r)ǫ
2(2− ǫ
2)+rǫ+O(1−δ),
69and this payoﬀ is larger than Ulow
1 (δ) for suﬃciently large δ. Note that player one’s deviations
always lead to a continuation game of complete information, hence the strategy proﬁle that
gives player one the payoﬀ Ulow
1 (δ) may be chosen as an equilibrium of the continuation
game. Player two’s strategy is by construction chosen to be a best response to player one’s
strategy. Hence there are no proﬁtable deviations for either player. ￿
C.4. Dispensing with irreducibility. Suppose now that the ﬁnite automata is not
irreducible and may have k > 1 recurrent classes. Notice each of these recurrent classes
uniquely identiﬁes a new irreducible ﬁnite automaton. The above construction can be made
for the irreducible automata identiﬁed by each of these recurrent classes. Let z∗ > 0 be the
minimum of the reputation levels of these k automata needed for Theorem 2 to hold. Consider
now the repeated game where  (ω) < z∗ and the strategy proﬁles where player one plays the
action o(θt) until the automata enters a recurrent class and from then on the continuation
strategy proﬁle is the review strategy proﬁle constructed using our construction for that
recurrent class. Since player one fully mimics the commitment type until the automaton
enters a recurrent class, his reputation level does not change until the automaton enters a
recurrent class. In this strategy proﬁle, each continuation strategy proﬁle once player one
has entered in a recurrent class gives player one a payoﬀ of at most ǫ. In this strategy proﬁle,
the payoﬀ of player one until the ﬁrst time that the automata enters a recurrent class goes
to zero as δ goes to one, and the payoﬀ of player one in the continuation game that starts
from any state of the recurrent classes is at most ǫ. Hence this strategy proﬁle gives player
one a payoﬀ not more than 2ǫ when the players are suﬃciently patient. Since ǫ is arbitrary,
Theorem 2 obtains.
C.5. Proof of Lemma 3. If there is a positive gap, γ > 0, and if NI is satisﬁed, then for
every ǫ > 0, there exists a v(ǫ) > 0 and a δ∗(ε) < 1 such that for every δ > δ∗(ε), we have
u
+
2 (u1,δ) − u
−
2 (u1,δ) > v(ε) for every u1 ∈ [ǫ,1].
Moreover, if Γ does not satisfy SA, then for every action a1 ∈ A1 of player one, there exists
an action proﬁle a′(a1) = (a′
1(a1),a2(a1)) ∈ A1 × A2 such that g1(a′(a1)) > g1(a1,a2(a1)). In
the description of the review strategy proﬁle, the revelation rule is   a1(θ) = a′
1(o(θ)). To give
the incentives to player two to play a′
2(o(θ)) at the revelation periods is possible by choosing
the continuation payoﬀs of player two after the revelation phase if player one reveals his
rationality to depend on the signal y ∈ Y . Continuation payoﬀs need vary only by some
number C(1−δ) where C is a constant that is independent of δ to make it optimal for player
two to play a′
1(o(θ)). The rest of the proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 2.
70C.6. Proof of the identity given by Equation 21. Recall that T(δ) is the largest
integer for which δT(δ) ≥ r.47 Let yt = r1(at
1,yt) − E {r1(at
1,yt)|ht}, where the expectation
is taken with respect to the measure Pσ1(δ),σ
nasty
2 (δ). We remind that E {r1(at
1,yt)|ht} ≤ 0 by
the deﬁnition of σ
nasty
2 (δ). Let δT be such that δT
T = r. Let xt,T = (1 − δT)δt
Tyt and notice
that xt,T is a martingale with respect to the measure Pσ1(δ),σ
nasty
2 (δ).
We will apply the LLN in Davidson (1994), Theorem 19.7. We now check that the three






















2 ) = 0. Hence, by Davidson (1994), Theorem 19.7,
 T
t=0 xtT →Lp 0.


























  = 0 and ys is bounded, we have
 T(δ)−1
s=0 (1−


















Since yt = r1(at
1,yt) − E {r1(at
1,yt)|ht} and E {r1(at
1,yt)|ht} ≤ 0, we have r1(at
1,yt) ≤ yt.
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